



# LOCAL SECURITY AND RESILIENCE IN DILI, TIMOR-LESTE

Damian Grenfell & Bronwyn Winch

# LOCAL SECURITY AND RESILIENCE IN DILI, TIMOR-LESTE

Damian Grenfell & Bronwyn Winch

December 2014

## **Local Security and Resilience in Dili, Timor-Leste**

Report authors: Damian Grenfell & Bronwyn Winch

Published by: The Asia Foundation

Photo credits: Conor Ashleigh (for The Asia Foundation) & Carmenesa Moniz Noronha Soares (page 7)

© Copyright 2014: The Asia Foundation and The Centre for Global Research

ISBN: 978-0-9871531-8-0

### **Acknowledgements**

We thank the members of the communities in Dili who gave their time to participate in this survey. We are indebted to Carmenesa Moniz Noronha Soares who led the research team in the five sites in Dili, and to the staff employed and students involved in undertaking this survey. We thank Lynze Woon for her assistance in Melbourne, as well as Emily Toome and Stefani Vasil. Our appreciation goes very much to Susan Marx, Country Representative of The Asia Foundation in Timor-Leste, for her support, and to Todd Wassel, Director of Safety and Security Programs, for his invaluable input and generous guidance. We also thank Lewti Hunghanfoo for her expertise in editing and designing this report.

For more information on the Timor-Leste Research Program hosted by The Centre for Global Research and RMIT University, please visit: [timor-research.org](http://timor-research.org)

For more information about The Asia Foundation and its programs, please visit:  
[www.asiafoundation.org](http://www.asiafoundation.org)

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACRONYMS	2
I. INTRODUCTION	3
Methodology	4
Orienting the report	5
About this report	6
II. PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY	7
Community security	7
Security in the capital	12
III. GENDER AND SECURITY	14
IV. JUSTICE AND SECURITY	19
The law	19
Responsible authorities	21
V. ATTITUDES ON SECURITY PROVISION	24
Policing	24
The state	26
External involvement: Security agents	28
Non-governmental organisations	29
VI. SOURCES OF INFORMATION	31
VII. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE	32
VIII. CONCLUSION	36
Key findings	36
Recommendations for future research	37
BIBLIOGRAPHY	38
END NOTES	43
APPENDIX 1: SURVEY DATA	50
APPENDIX 2: QUESTIONNAIRE	52

# ACRONYMS

BOP	<i>Batalhão de Ordem Pública</i> (Public Order Battalion)
COE	<i>Companhia de Operações Especiais</i> (Special Operations Company)
CSP	<i>Companhia de Segurança Pessoal</i> (Close Protection Company)
F-FDTL	<i>Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste</i> (Timor-Leste Defense Force)
FPU	Formed Police Units
GNR	<i>Guarda Nacional Republicana</i> (Portuguese police unit)
IDP	Internally Displaced Person(s)
ISF	International Stabilisation Force
MAG	Martial Arts Groups
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PNTL	<i>Polícia Nasionál Timor-Leste</i> (National Police of Timor-Leste)
UIR	<i>Unidade Intervensaun Rápida</i> (Rapid Response Unit)
UN	United Nations
UNAMET	United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNPOL	United Nations Police
UPF	<i>Unidade Patrullamentu Fronteira</i> (Border Patrol Unit)
URP	<i>Unidade de Reserva da Polícia</i>
RDTL	<i>República Democrática de Timor-Leste</i> (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste)

# I. INTRODUCTION

This report examines community views of security in Dili, the capital of Timor-Leste. Based primarily on a survey and short interviews with members of five communities across Dili in the first half of 2011, and a range of subsequent literature, the report provides an insight into different dimensions of public perceptions of security. The themes covered include views of whether security has improved in communities, how communities reproduce security in terms of both local and state authority structures, as well as public views of engagement with security actors. These questions were important to ask, not least given that Dili has endured several significant periods of intense violence over its recent history, once at the end of the Indonesian occupation, and again from 2006 to 2008.

By 1999, attempts to integrate the former Portuguese colony into the nation of Indonesia had failed, as demonstrated by the overwhelming vote in favour of independence for Timor-Leste on 30 August of that year. The consequent violent withdrawal of the Indonesian armed forces and militia in 1999 left much of the material infrastructure of Dili destroyed, emptying the city almost entirely of its population. The ‘sacking’ of Dili served both a symbolic and practical purpose, as destruction of the capital in effect incapacitated the political centre of the new nation.<sup>1</sup> More than 400,000 people were forcibly displaced (Robinson 2003, 25), including to West Timor.<sup>2</sup> The subsequent repatriation of people to the devastated capital saw land and housing in Dili re-occupied, not only those homes that had been vacated by Indonesians, but also those which had been owned by displaced East Timorese.

While riots in 2002,<sup>3</sup> protests by veterans in 2004<sup>4</sup>, and large demonstrations led by the church in 2005<sup>5</sup> each confirmed the capital as a potential space for different forms of political contestation, the period known as ‘the crisis’ proved to be the most serious. Originating in a split in the armed forces (F-FDTL), nearly 600 soldiers abandoned their barracks in early 2006 over accusations within the military of discrimination of *Loromonu* (a term used to describe those from the Western districts of the country) by *Lorosa’e* (those from the three eastern-most districts).<sup>6</sup> In late March, multiple disturbances reported in the capital were said to be assuming an ‘east versus west dynamic as youths from both regions became embroiled in the petitioner issue’ (United Nations 2006, 22). Violence erupted at the end of April with demonstrations staged outside Government Palace,<sup>7</sup> and from this point the security apparatus of the state largely disintegrated into competing factions.<sup>8</sup> The homes of military leaders and politicians were attacked,<sup>9</sup> opposing factions engaged in a series of ambushes against one another,<sup>10</sup> and there was the massacre of police by members of the military in the middle of Dili on 25 May.<sup>11</sup> With ministers arming civilians<sup>12</sup> the situation was spiralling out of control and an Australian-led International Stabilisation Force (ISF) was deployed in an effort to contain the violence.<sup>13</sup> The second UN Peace Keeping mission (UNMIT) mobilised on 25 August 2006, consisting of an international police force (UNPOL) that assumed full command of national policing on 13 September 2006 (ICG 2006, 16, 18).

With the collapse of the police force and divisions in the military, communal violence erupted in Dili.<sup>14</sup> Gang violence became pronounced, mirroring to a significant degree the ‘ethnic-territorial dimensions of the *Lorosa’e* and *Loromonu* divisions in the military’ but was ‘also shaped by the interests of political parties and the control of local urban territories by the gangs themselves’ (Grenfell 2009, 181). Attacks for control over land, houses and economic advantage were common,<sup>15</sup> fuelled by grievances as people returned following the 1999 violence (Harrington 2006, 2; Jutersonke *et al* 2010, 31). With widespread destruction of houses and government buildings, looting and the burning of key markets and bus stations, parts of the capital became ‘no go’ zones as violence became increasingly protracted (Brady 2006, 13; Jutersonke *et al* 2010, 31). Many within the capital fled their homes, the city dotted with makeshift camps as people sought refuge in government buildings, schools, parks and churches. Even the national airport housed tents to its front entrance. In total, some 150,000

people were displaced (IDPs) (Van de Auweraert 2012, 16). The 2007 national elections were held and resulted in a new government, though it was not until February 2008 that the crisis reached a kind of deadly conclusion with the attempted assassinations of President José Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão. This incident resulted in the death of rebel leader Alfredo Reinado and the subsequent declaration of a 'state of siege'.<sup>16</sup>


The research for this report came at an important time in terms of gauging community perceptions of security and levels of local patterns of resilience. By 2011, pressing issues relating to the 2006-2008 crisis had been largely resolved, at least in an immediate sense. The closure of the IDP camps,<sup>17</sup> a negotiated settlement with the petitioners, the diminished threat of armed groups, and the return of policing control to the PNTL in March 2011,<sup>18</sup> contributed to an increasing sense of stability in the capital. While these events suggested the potential for an improved sense of security, the continuing presence of the ISF served as a reminder that any improvement in general stability remained underpinned, to a certain extent, by the presence of a foreign military force.

While there has been no repeat of the scale of violence which characterised the 2006-2008 crisis, and the 2012 elections were managed largely in a context of peaceful political contestation, recent events demonstrate the importance of understanding people's responses to risks and threats, how authority structures augment one another, and how people become aware of security related incidents. For instance, across September and October 2013, Dili experienced a heightened period of insecurity due to a spate of violent incidents.<sup>19</sup> These had a tangible effect on the capital's population, not just with an increased security presence on the streets, but with a noticeable impact on mobility (especially in the evenings). The concern in this report then is not just people's physical security or the reallocation of limited resources in terms of policing, but also a question of quality of life, especially given that people often live with a high level of precariousness.

## Methodology

Surveys were conducted over March and April in five suku<sup>20</sup> across Dili. These were **Becora**, on the eastern side of Dili; **Bemori**, a small suburb bordering Santa Cruz to the west, Audian to the north and Kuluhun to the south; **Bairro Pite**, relatively central to Dili and south of what is colloquially known as 'Banana Road'; **Comoro**, a large suku based around the Comoro River and Comoro Road, which links the centre of Dili to the airport and outward bound roads heading west; and **Lahane Oriental**, bordered to the east by Becora, and the beginning of the road out of Dili to Aileu, Maubisse and the South Coast. These five sites were chosen as they provided a combination of geographic spread across Dili, and were also impacted differently by the crisis. Across 2006-2008 Comoro, Bairro Pite and Becora were all known for being 'hot spots' for violence and ongoing conflict between gangs. In contrast, Lahane Oriental and Bemori appeared to face fewer problems.

A total of 812 respondents were surveyed (a target of 160 respondents per suku) using availability sampling with respondents 17 years or older. Further demographic details such as age, gender, district of birth and literacy levels are located in **Appendix 1: Survey Data**. The survey team comprised six members, four women and two men, all East Timorese, and who could each speak a number of different languages. The teams undertook the surveys in pairs (primarily for security) and worked as a group through neighbourhoods in each of the sites in Dili. The survey was delivered orally, with a team member filling out the respondents' answers on the survey form. Most questions used a five-point Likert scale allowing graduated answers from positive to negative, and varied from norm-based to experientially-framed questions. Four members of the survey team also undertook short interviews (24 in total) based on a select number of survey questions. These interviews were carried out in an abridged structured interview form, allowing for justifications and further explanations detailing why respondents answered the survey questions as they had.



Data from the surveys in this report has been treated in accordance with a ‘descriptive’ approach rather than ‘inferentially’. This means that we focus our analysis on the responses of those people surveyed rather than using the data to make more generalised claims with regards to the capital’s population. There are a number of methodological reasons for this approach in this instance, and in turn is the reason as to why we don’t state ‘margins for error’ or ‘confidence levels’ for the survey data. In this way the data provides an important snapshot of the views of a sample of people who were living in a select number of suburbs in Dili at the time the survey was completed.

### Orienting the report

For the purposes of this report, we define security as a state where risks may exist but their actuation remains limited or contained, whereas peace is a condition where there is an absence of risks *per se*.<sup>21</sup> By resilience, we mean the ability of communities to find sustainable patterns of living together, including recognised and workable patterns of conflict resolution, especially in the face of threat, disaster or social turmoil. Hence in the context of Dili, in a general sense, the report is interested in patterns of resilience in terms of how communities may have been able to re-thread social connections in the years following the crisis, both locally but also in relation to institutions of governance, and generate meaningful practices where multiple levels of leadership or different conflict resolution practices are drawn on.

The terms customary and modern are used throughout this report, with the former taken here to refer to a world view which *manifests* in a set of practices and beliefs that in Timor-Leste are most clearly demonstrated by the *uma lulik* (sacred house),<sup>22</sup> a belief in *lisan*<sup>23</sup> (often referred to as *adat*), and *lulik*,<sup>24</sup> the sacredness of objects or places.<sup>25</sup> The adjudication of disputes within a community, and



findings of who is at fault or what penalties should be applied, are undertaken by customary leaders, often referred to as a *lia nain*, the 'holder of the word'. Our use of the term 'modern', in turn refers to set of practices based ostensibly in very different authority structures and systems of governance. The idea of the modern state, or of modern law as one demonstration of this view of the world, is typically derived from patterns of organisation that are understood in their ideal form as applicable and common to all within a given society (and universal in many respects), with rules and laws created in a particular form of logic rather than, for instance, on localised conventions. These are of course simply analytical categories, and there can be much interplay and overlap between them, but it nevertheless is important to make clear that the sanction of a *lia nain*,<sup>26</sup> bound within a particular extended family and as the interpreter of *lisan*, will often have far more potency as an authority figure in Timor-Leste than a police officer, recruited on merit and deployed to enforce a generalisable public law.

## About this report

The research for this report was conducted by RMIT University's Timor-Leste Research Program (*Peskiza Timor-Leste*), which began working in the country in 2003. The program has always been a small research outfit based around a combination of RMIT staff, postgraduate and undergraduate students, and East Timorese staff. It has undertaken a wide range of work with communities and different organisations, run several major research events, provided research training, as well as hosted student study tours. By 2011, the program decided to close its small office in Dili, continuing the program from Melbourne.

There were a range of reasons why it was felt initially that this research was worth doing. One important reason was that in other research we had been undertaking at a more institutional level, it was not an uncommon view that both the underlying causes of the crisis had not been resolved, and moreover, that something similar could occur again. How, for instance, did these sentiments play out at a community level? The second reason was to try to understand the difference in how people experience violence in terms of large-scale mass violence and upheaval, as opposed to violence and insecurity in an everyday sense. To an outsider, Dili might have seemed relatively more secure by 2011. That does not mean however that security is experienced the same by everyone, as some people may feel comparatively insecure even when there is a more generalised peace. The third reason for the survey was to get a sense of people's relationship to the state, both in a more generalised sense of legitimacy (through their relationship to law for instance) and also more directly to different institutional formations, particularly the police. This leads to the last point that motivated this research, namely the interest in understanding the role of different authority structures in conflict resolution and the production of security. Dili is typically characterised as the modern-urban centre of Timor-Leste, and yet it would seem odd if somehow customary authority structures did not still influence the lives of the population, and inform negotiations over conflict in some way, not least given its continuing importance in communities across Timor-Leste.

The field research team, headed by Carmenesa Moniz Noronha Soares, trained and recruited a team of surveyors, getting around to different sites in Dili by taxi and *microlet* (bus), keying in data into our small office in Farol. Following on from closing the Timor-Leste Research Program office in Dili, a lack of resources and changes in work by RMIT staff meant that there were simply not the means in which to turn the survey data into analysis. It was not until a chance conversation between RMIT and The Asia Foundation (TAF) staff at the Australian National University (ANU) Timor-Update Conference in late 2013 that a common interest in seeing the data developed was identified. It was soon agreed that a short report would be developed, and to ensure that the data from the survey was given as contemporary a framing as possible, analysis based on the survey data would be augmented by reports and academic writings to develop and contextualise those ideas, as well as providing a

full reference list for those who may want to further develop this area of research (see attached bibliography).




This report complements The Asia Foundation’s Safety and Security Program which regularly conducts research on security, law and justice in Timor-Leste, and publishes reports that aim to inform program implementation as well as other stakeholders working in the security sector, researchers and policy makers. The Asia Foundation currently implements a Community-Policing Program with one target area in Dili. As part of larger efforts, this report is expected to inform future program implementation as well as help provide baselines for perception of security issues in Dili. It will be of interest to those working in the field of security, policing, peace-building and development, both at a government and NGO-level, as well as within communities. We hope that the findings will help in developing a sense of some of the complexities involved in how security and peace are formed in an urbanised site such as Dili, and in a way that others can build from.

## II. PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY

### **Community security**

In seeking to understand the nature of local security in Dili, it was important that the survey articulated a sense of how people felt in relation to safety within their respective communities and as they moved about the capital. In order to garner such information, a number of survey questions were asked that both sought to understand people’s sense of security in the context of where they lived and across Dili more generally, as well as by comparing the period of time that the survey was completed (2011) with earlier periods.



Survey results for Question Eight, which asked people if they felt secure in their immediate community, demonstrated overwhelmingly positive responses. The question asked for a generalised sense of security and as such did not place any qualifiers on what a person may have felt insecure from—such as gang violence, theft, communal conflict, intimidation, assault, or gender-based violence—which all may have changed the rate of response. Overall, 86.0 per cent of respondents felt secure in the communities where they currently lived, a further 4.3 per cent indicated that they ‘Perhaps’ felt secure. Only 2.8 per cent surveyed expressed that they either ‘Did Not’ or ‘Perhaps Did Not’ feel secure, and 6.8 per cent gave a neutral response.

Question 8. Do you feel secure in the community where you live now?										
	Bairro Pite		Becora		Bemori		Comoro		Lahane Oriental	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Not secure	1	0.6	1	0.6	0	0.0	7	4.2	0	0
Perhaps not secure	5	3.1	1	0.6	1	0.6	5	3.0	2	1.2
Neutral	14	8.8	12	7.3	8	5.1	12	7.2	9	5.6
Perhaps secure	10	6.3	6	3.7	7	4.4	8	4.8	4	2.5
Yes, secure	129	80.6	144	87.8	142	89.9	135	80.8	146	90.7
Total	159	100.0	164	100.0	158	100.0	167	100.0	161	100.0

Despite overall positive responses there was some variance across sites. Residents in Lahane Oriental felt the most secure (90.7 per cent), with no respondents answering that they did not feel secure. In comparison, residents in Comoro registered the lowest levels of feeling secure (80.4 per cent), while also registering the highest percentage of people who answered that they ‘Did Not’ or ‘Perhaps Did Not’ feel secure (7.2 per cent).

The overall high percentage of positive responses to this question was the closest to a unanimous response in the survey. This is significant for a range of reasons, for one, it demonstrates that while from an outsider’s perspective some areas of Dili might appear insecure, the majority of locals were willing to designate their own communities as sites of security.<sup>27</sup>


One factor when considering why people may feel such high levels of security relates to the way family connections factor into migration patterns in the capital, with 43.0 per cent of Dili’s population having migrated to join immediate or extended family in the capital<sup>28</sup> or through marriage.<sup>29</sup> Many people may feel a sense of relative safety in their immediate communities where family relations are

concentrated.<sup>30</sup> As such, while particular areas may have higher levels of crime, the close proximity of resident’s homes to (extended) family may be one contributing factor to why such high rates of positive responses were recorded.

It is also important to note that such responses can be conditioned by unwillingness to speak badly about their own community, especially to outsiders and also out of concern for any ramifications that may arise from presenting their community in a negative light. Additionally, how people gauge their security can be conditioned by the research method itself, in this instance a survey,<sup>31</sup> and how the questions are delivered and explained to participants.<sup>32</sup> For instance, and as has been noted in other studies, there may have been a sense that people were speaking about particular forms of violence, such as mass or generalised occurrences of violence, rather than the experience of more immediate or localised forms.<sup>33</sup> Nevertheless, from Question Eight, it is evident that people were overwhelmingly willing to indicate that they felt secure in their local communities in Dili.

### *Comparing with the past*

Two questions were asked so as to understand people’s sense of security at the community level in comparison with earlier periods of time. Question Nine asked community members if they felt more secure than two years earlier—corresponding to the first half of 2009—a point in time when the effects of the crisis were still being felt. These include IDP reintegration and return to communities,<sup>34</sup> the negotiation of a settlement between the Government and petitioners,<sup>35</sup> and the arrest of those involved in the attempted assassinations of the President and Prime Minister in February 2008.<sup>36</sup> Question Ten posed the same question, but asked respondents to compare their security to five years earlier, coinciding with the 2006-07 crisis. This was a period of generalised social turmoil within the capital, with differentiated effects across communities. The objective of these questions was to understand change over time, allowing for a temporally staggered view on whether there had been a perceived sense of improvement in people’s security. Only those who had lived continuously in their communities for these respective periods were asked this question.



Significantly, these figures demonstrate that the vast majority of people felt safer in 2011 than in earlier periods with 73.4 per cent saying that they ‘Definitely’ felt more secure than two years earlier, and 68.0 per cent saying that they ‘Definitely’ felt more secure than five years earlier. Another 5.3 per

cent of people indicated that they 'Probably' felt more secure than both previous points in time. When considering those that answered 'Definitely' more secure, it is worth noting the 5.4 per cent variation between Question Nine and Ten. This demonstrates that more people felt secure when comparing 2011 to 2006 than when comparing 2011 to 2009.<sup>37</sup> The other point to note is that even by 2011, there were still just over 20.0 per cent of community members surveyed that were not willing to identify as feeling more secure, even though the general situation in Dili seemed a great deal calmer since the crisis. Of those who did not attest to feeling safer than five years earlier, 14.6 per cent indicated a neutral response (neither more nor less secure than five years before), 2.7 per cent said they were 'probably not' more secure, and 5.1 per cent 'definitely not' more secure.


Importantly, these figures indicate that while there was a general improvement in terms of how people felt with regards to security in their local community over time, it was not evenly experienced. For some, the relatively generalised calm of 2011 was not necessarily translating to a personal sense of security, and as a community becomes more secure for a majority of people, it may not be so for all residents. Further research might show, for instance, that such data is conditioned by an individual's more immediate or recent experiences of violence, such as theft or assault against them, which might be magnified in comparison to more distant experiences, thereby influencing their response.<sup>38</sup>

Alternatively, in periods of more general turmoil, some people may have been able to remain relatively isolated from risk. It could be, for example, that for some people their house or street provided relative safety during the crisis. However, with the crisis over, the comparative sense of safety of the home or local community could have deteriorated, and in turn that site may have become more pronounced as a site of risk or insecurity. Or equally, while the most dramatic periods of the crisis have passed, very localised problems still regularly continue as well as issues that had been exacerbated from the crisis, which left unresolved, persist in causing tension. For example, land disputes (some of which may have arisen in part as a result of unresolved conflict or tension with returned IDPs or new residents in the community, as well as social jealousy relating to grievances of the Government's *Cash Grants Scheme*),<sup>39</sup> gang-related violence,<sup>40</sup> frequent revenge-attacks based on unresolved issues,<sup>41</sup> or escalation of interpersonal disputes or assaults into collective violence often involving family or community members,<sup>42</sup> all continue to occur in different sites in Dili in a way that suggests that insecurity for some is an enduring aspect of life.<sup>43</sup> Different kinds of unevenness and tensions in perceptions of security can be seen in other subsequent research, such as The Asia Foundation's 2013 survey on community police perceptions, where, despite feeling that overall security had improved, 64.0 per cent of respondents said that they were still concerned about personal safety within their locality (Wassel & Rajalingam 2014, 24, 26).


### *Peace and Resilience*

Question Twelve asked community members, 'Do you think there is **peace** in your local community?' to which 81.2 per cent responded 'Definitely Yes'. This is slightly lower than that of perceptions of security as discussed above (Question Eight). This question also elicited a slightly higher percentage of people who answered neutrally (9.5 per cent) and negatively (3.6 per cent) in comparison to responses to the earlier questions on perceptions of security.

Q12. DO YOU THINK THAT THERE IS PEACE IN YOUR LOCAL COMMUNITY?



As per the discussion in the introduction, in this survey we took the view that it was worth seeing if people had different views on 'peace' and 'security'. Our view is that security is a condition where the potential for harm is contained or mitigated, whereas peace is a condition where there is an absence of perceived risk *per se*. However we are aware that in practice the terms may well be used in an interchangeable way which also assumes that if there is peace, people should feel secure. Nevertheless, the differentiation between the perceptions of security and peace, with fewer feeling that there is peace, may have suggested that while there were relative levels of stability in communities at the time of the survey, there were potential points of tension, conflict, or unresolved issues that concerned some. Moreover, some people may feel a sense of security in the knowledge that if a conflict or problem were to arise, the presence of security forces would assist in mitigating that threat, but this did not mean a peace *per se*.<sup>44</sup>



For Question Twenty, 84.1 per cent of respondents said that when problems arose in their community, the community had the means to find a solution. Here, 'solution' was taken to mean leadership, conflict resolution processes, as well as patterns of practice that indicate social resilience such as trust and established communication channels. In terms of resilience in maintaining order and stability, these results suggest that most respondents felt that their community was in a position to

actively participate and direct the resolution or mitigation of a problem. This may still be the case even where external involvement in the form of policing is also present, suggesting that local governance structures continue to have an influential role in conflict resolution as reflected in short interviews.

*“We need to call the community authorities like the xefe suku or xefe aldeia so that they can talk”*

Respondent, Comoro

For Question Twenty, Bairro Pite had the lowest percentage of people who thought that solutions could ‘Definitely’ be found from within the community (70.3 per cent). In comparison, Bemori had the highest percentage of respondents who selected the same answer (82.2 per cent). The comparative results for these two sites are significant in that they are consistent with views on police involvement in community problems (Question Eighteen and Twenty-Four).<sup>45</sup> As will be discussed later, Bairro Pite had the highest percentage of respondents in favour of police involvement, while Bemori had the lowest percentage of respondents in favour of police involvement. Two points to consider here are the different patterns of settlement as well as experiences of violence during the crisis. Historically, much of the west of the capital is concentrated with Indonesian-era housing, and major shifts in population post-1999 have meant that the population of these areas has almost doubled (Scamby 2013, 1939). Bairro Pite and Comoro have a significantly higher population than the other three sites (27,875 and 65,404, respectively).<sup>46</sup> As such, this has meant that the ‘clusters’ of Indonesian housing became the worst conflict zones during the crisis, that they continue to experience communal violence, and that there is a ‘potent legacy of over-crowding and contested property claims’ (Scamby 2013, 1939).

## **Security in the capital**


Questions Thirteen and Fourteen, and Fifteen and Sixteen, asked people to reflect more generally on their sense of security in Dili as they moved away for instance from their homes to other locations (e.g. school, work, markets or the homes of relatives living elsewhere), and also to compare security in Dili to other districts.

### *Comparing with the past*


Questions Thirteen and Fourteen replicated the form of two earlier questions by asking people to compare their security with that of two and five years earlier, but this time in terms of the capital more generally, to see if people felt an improved sense of moving around Dili. In response, a majority of people felt more secure than they did two years earlier, with 67.0 per cent ‘Definitely’ feeling more secure, and 8.8 per cent ‘Probably’ feeling more secure. Only 2.5 per cent said that they definitely did not feel more secure, 2.7 per cent had no opinion, while 15.5 per cent felt ‘Neutral’.

While the large majority of people felt more secure in Dili in comparison to five years earlier during the crisis (63.8 per cent said ‘Definitely Yes’, and 7.7 per cent said ‘Probably Yes’), there was also a high rate of neutral answers (15.2 per cent). In comparison to two years earlier, there was also a slight decrease in positive answers (-3.2 per cent), and a small increase in negative responses as opposed to two years ago (+2.3 per cent). As with Question Ten discussed above (which asked the same question but in people’s own communities), the higher rate of people indicating that either there had been no change (neutral response) or negative change in how they viewed their security, again demonstrates how for some, the experience of security is contextual and individual. For instance, it is conceivable that a person was able to navigate the crisis without necessarily feeling acute risk, but in more recent years many have not been as fortunate, perhaps experiencing some form of crime or other threat. For these respondents, Dili may be felt to be less secure than it once was. Similar to responses elicited in Question Nine and 10, it may also be that time is having an effect on people’s perceptions, and that

more immediate experiences are impacting on their perceptions.



For Question Fifteen, the majority of people felt that more crime was committed in Dili (63.1 per cent answered 'Definitely Dili' and 10.2 per cent answered 'Probably Dili') than in other districts. In response to Question Sixteen however, those that felt they were more secure in Dili than in other districts cumulatively made up just over 51.0 per cent (43.2 per cent answered 'Definitely Dili' and 7.8 per cent answered 'Probably Dili'). Based on these figures, for a proportion of those surveyed, the data suggests a level of differentiation between an awareness of crime and the experience of security.



There are several points here worth reflecting on in terms of the different patterns of answers. Firstly, nearly 30.0 per cent of respondents in this survey were born in Dili, and as such it makes sense that many of them may feel a higher level of security in Dili than they would in other districts, especially given differing levels of familiarity, familial connections and so forth. Similarly, respondents who



felt either 'Definitely' or 'Probably' more secure in other districts (9.3 per cent and 6.9 per cent, respectively) could be explained by greater distance or isolation from the communities which they migrated from, in turn suggesting a comparatively lower level of security in the capital.<sup>47</sup> The high rate of neutral responses could be accounted for by the fact that the questions asked about the districts in a generalised sense, and people may have felt that certain districts might present more risk than others.<sup>48</sup> Another factor that was made evident during the interviews was a perceived value in the concentration of security forces in the capital. This may go some way in understanding why, despite acknowledgement of higher levels of criminality in Dili, people's sense of security remains conditioned by factors such as a readier access to law enforcement:

*"Because armed forces such as F-FDTL, PNTL and UNPOL are concentrated in Dili, I feel that it is safer than in other districts"*

Respondent, Bemori

*"I think Dili is safer because the police will come if you call them. But in the districts, the police can be really far away, and so I think it would be less safe"*

Respondent, Bemori

*"I think Dili is safer, because if problems happen you can call the police and they will come quickly"*

Respondent, Comoro

For some respondents, there was also an acknowledgment that more crime was committed in Dili, but not in their own community. This may reflect a genuine sense of lower crime rates in different communities, but may well also reflect the sentiment discussed earlier, where there can be a hesitancy to present one's community in a negative light:

*"In my bairru [suburb] there are no problems, but other bairrus always have problems"*

Respondent, Bemori

*"[More crimes are committed] in the foho [mountains]. In Dili a lot too, but not in my bairru. So for me, more crime occurs in the foho, because they don't really have security"*


Respondent, Bemori

### III. GENDER AND SECURITY

The purpose of Question Eleven and Twenty-One was to gauge people's opinions of whether they thought security was experienced differently for males and females and on the role of women in conflict resolution in their community. It is important, before embarking on analysis of these questions, to qualify how security was generally spoken of and interpreted through this survey. In general terms, 'security' was taken to have a very 'public quality to it', as something outside or beyond the domain of the household (Grenfell & Winch 2014, 241). To ask someone if they felt secure was generally taken to mean as on the street, on transport, at work and so on, but not in the domestic sphere. Accordingly—particularly given the context of such high rates of domestic violence<sup>49</sup>—someone could conceivably report feeling secure even though they may experience acute levels of violence within the household. Public sources of data on cases of sexual and gender-based violence are relatively limited, in part because of the prevailing cultural norms and social stigmatisation that impedes women from reporting their experience or seeking help (Harris-Rimmer 2009, 4).<sup>50</sup> As such, for some respondents the experience of violence within the private domain would not be something that they would i) wish to speak about with an outsider undertaking a public survey when asked in this context; or ii) factor

into their judgement of feeling secure in their community more generally.<sup>51</sup>

Q11. DO YOU THINK MEN OR WOMEN FEEL MORE SECURE IN YOUR LOCAL COMMUNITY?



In response to Question Eleven, roughly half of the survey respondents (53.5 per cent) felt that men and women experience the same level of security in their community. This suggests that even if potential risks were different, many people expressed the view that both sexes experienced the same level of security (or inversely, insecurity).<sup>52</sup> For instance, in such a view, males might face greater risks in terms of gang violence, and women of sexual assault, thus putting both groups on relatively equal footing in terms of security. While the majority of respondents felt that security was 'The same for both', it is possible that the figures from this survey may, to some extent, also reflect the effects of the 'socialisation of gender frameworks' over recent years, and of wanting to portray that risk for both sexes was equal.<sup>53</sup> There may also be a tendency to reflect on the community as a collective whole (or more broadly to represent their community in a positive light) rather than wanting to define security along gender lines, a sentiment demonstrated in various short interviews.

*"In my opinion males and females feel safe because [reality shows that] females and males conduct their activities freely. Because of this, I believe that females and males in this bairro love peace"*<sup>54</sup>

Female Respondent, Bairro Pite

*"I think it is the same [for men and women] because now in our community the situation is normal, there are no problems or conflict"*

Female Respondent, Bemori

*"In this community, men and women experience the same security because we have no problems. But when there are problems, both men and women will feel insecure"*

Male Respondent, Comoro

*"In my bairro I don't know yet if females or males feel more secure because since the crisis we all feel safe and we don't commit crimes. Some of the problems that we have are individual family problems, and these are resolved within the family home. Because of this, I can't say whether females or males feel safer but I think that we are just neutral but those problems that do happen within our bairro are resolved within our home and we don't take them to local authorities or police.*

*This is my understanding of female or male security in our bairro."*

Male Respondent, Bemori

In instances where it was felt that women and men experienced security differently, it was clear that a significantly higher number of respondents thought that men were more secure (a cumulative total of 33.1 per cent), in comparison to only 11.6 per cent who said that women felt more secure. The view held by a minority that women are more secure than men can be understood at least in part where women are not seen as participating in activities that pose the same level of risk, for instance by gang violence or territorial disputes, as expressed directly in the first quote below, and intimated in the second.

*“In my opinion, women feel more secure because they do not commit crimes and aren’t involved in Martial-Arts related problems. That is how I can say that females are safer”*

Male Respondent, Comoro

*“I think both are safe but if we are talking about youth, then they can have negative thoughts because they get drunk at night, they look for people to make problems with, and then problems happen in our community”*


Male Respondent, Bairro Pite

Such a view does not appear to account for violence perpetrated within the household, and seems contrary to other findings on the role of males in the perpetration and experience of violence itself (discussed below). Moreover, that women are ‘not part’ of such activities is part of a larger gendered landscape that differentiates societal roles where women often regulate their social engagement accordingly. Anecdotally for instance, women in Dili will more often stay nearby the home, undertake travel around Dili with greater care, and will typically not venture out after dark without a male companion—especially due to the risks of sexual intimidation, harassment and assault—accounting for the different precautions that they must take. What needs further exploration is the ways in which societal expectations, and the gendered landscape, mean that women normalise everyday precautions to the point that it appears simply natural, and as such harder to challenge and change.

While the majority of respondents felt that security was the same for men and women, and the second highest majority of respondents (27.6 per cent) said that they thought men felt more secure, it is worth pointing out a conflicting national statistic on male involvement in violence which appears to show men as more adverse to risk and insecurity than females, in a public space at least. Belun’s *Conflict Potential Analysis* report from the same time period of this survey found that men constituted 83.0 per cent of the initiators and 70.0 per cent of victims in incidents (in comparison to females representing 17.0 per cent of the victims in incidents) (Belun 2011, 11).<sup>55</sup> While not measuring the same thing (security perceptions by gender as opposed to involvement in incidents), there is still some sense of tension in the two sets of results that could at least be partly explained by the fact that in the survey for this report, people were being asked about their own communities, as opposed to statistics compiled through a system of national monitoring.

When the results from Question Eleven are cross tabulated with the sex of the respondent, there were only slight differences in the percentage of female (54.2 per cent) and male (52.7 per cent) respondents who said that both sexes feel the same sense of security (53.5 per cent). Female respondents (9.7 per cent) were almost twice as likely as male respondents (5.1 per cent) to report that women definitely feel more secure in the local community. In the reverse, slightly greater proportions of male (35.7 per cent) than female (31.0 per cent) respondents indicated that it is men who either definitely or probably feel more secure in the local community.


Q11. DO YOU THINK MEN OR WOMEN FEEL MORE SECURE IN YOUR LOCAL COMMUNITY?



**Women in conflict resolution**

Survey results for Question Twenty-One showed a very clear indication that most people felt that women have an important role to play in conflict resolution. The majority of people responded positively (74.8 per cent felt that women ‘Definitely’ played a role; and 7.7 per cent felt women ‘Probably’ played a role). No other option for a response garnered over 10.0. However, some differences were observable across survey sites. Comoro demonstrated the lowest percentage in terms of people saying that women ‘Definitely’ had an important role (65.9 per cent), in comparison to the highest percentage elicited in Lahane Oriental (81.9 per cent). Inversely, Comoro had the highest percentage of respondents who felt that women ‘Definitely’ did not have an important role (6.6 per cent), whereas Lahane Oriental had the lowest percentage of respondents answer the same way (1.9 per cent).

Q21. DO YOU THINK WOMEN HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION WITHIN YOUR COMMUNITY OR NOT?



These results may appear counter-intuitive in the sense that typical leadership roles associated with conflict resolution in Timor-Leste are heavily male dominated (Grenfell *et al* 2009, 118; Kovar & Harrington 2013, 215). Female roles are limited to social-familial responsibilities in the domestic realm, their leadership often limited to ‘women’s-only spaces’ such as women’s groups (Trembath *et al* 2010, 10). The question did not specify to what extent or specific role a woman would play in processes

of conflict resolution. Therefore, as women are not usually recognised as having ‘equal significance to male lines of responsibility’ (ibid, 9), one way of understanding these results is to focus more on conflict resolution as a process, rather than the gendered nature of leadership roles. If, for instance, communities are understood as something other than a sum of individuals, then it is possible that women are deemed as important in the sense that any resolution requires their participation.<sup>56</sup> In this sense, it may not matter that a woman is seen to participate in food preparation or inversely has a narrower space for speaking,<sup>57</sup> as the value of her involvement is part of an ethic of community participation and validation of a solution. Thinking further on the community as a collective whole, the necessity of female involvement, albeit conditioned, is reflected in the following response:


*“I don’t believe women are prepared yet to resolve problems. It is better if they work together with men, because if they attempt to resolve an issue by themselves there could be issues down the track. However I do believe female participation is important. Females and males need to work together to resolve problems”*

Male Respondent, Comoro

On the one hand, this kind of response renders females as inadequate to participate in the resolution of problems, and any attempt to do so will in turn be the cause of risks or problems in the future. However, female participation was still deemed important, seemingly as they are part of the social group which is involved in the actual problem at hand, even if not in terms of actually affirming the decisions made.

When Question Twenty-One is disaggregated with the sex of the survey respondent, near equal proportions of female respondents (74.7 per cent) and male respondents (74.9 per cent) indicated that all respondents felt that women ‘Definitely’ have an important role in conflict resolution within their community. Across the surveys, there were only marginal differences in how females and males answered this question. Male respondents were slightly more likely to answer that women probably have an important role in conflict resolution within their community (9.9 per cent) than were female respondents (6.0 per cent).

Q21. DO YOU THINK WOMEN HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION WITHIN YOUR COMMUNITY OR NOT?




## IV. JUSTICE AND SECURITY

In Timor-Leste, responsibilities and avenues for maintaining law and order reflect a range of actors and layers, both between national and local levels of governance, as well as across customary and modern forms of conflict resolution.<sup>58</sup> Reflecting this context, a series of questions in this survey sought to understand both the relationship with the state more broadly in terms of the public acceptance of modern law, as well as how different systems of authority and conflict resolution processes intersect to produce security in the capital. An important point to keep in mind with these figures is that state institutions, including police, are far more concentrated, developed and better resourced in Dili than is the case in many rural communities.


### The law

Although responses to Question Six, which asked ‘In general, do people in Dili respect the law of the state?’ and Question Seven—‘Do people have to follow the law even if they think it is wrong?’—were positive, these results were noticeably less affirming than other survey results discussed through this report. For Question Six, cumulatively 72.3 per cent of people responded by agreeing that people in the capital do respect the law, while a much-reduced 50.0 per cent felt that people should follow the law even when they disagree with it (28.5 per cent ‘Agreed’ and 21.5 per cent ‘Strongly Agreed’). Both questions registered a relatively high ‘Neutral’ response, and it is noteworthy that a total of 27.9 per cent of respondents disagreed with Question Seven (21.1 per cent answered ‘Disagree’ and 6.8 per cent said ‘Strongly Disagree’), effectively saying that if people disagree with a law, there is no need to follow it.

Q6. IN GENERAL, DO PEOPLE IN DILI RESPECT THE LAW OF THE STATE?



Q7. DO PEOPLE HAVE TO FOLLOW THE LAW EVEN IF THEY THINK IT IS WRONG?




These questions were broadly aimed at understanding how people related to modern law through the state in the years following the crisis. Was there for instance a tension between the nationalism of the post-independence period which may manifest in a strong connection to a newly independent state, and the effects of the crisis on people’s perceptions of state legitimacy? It is noticeable that the number of people who disagree sharply rises from Question Six to Question Seven (from 3.5 per cent to 21.1 per cent), suggesting a clear disparity between the recognition given to laws created through the state *per se*, as opposed to laws that are for whatever reason deemed as inappropriate. A

contributing factor could be the historical context of the state during the Portuguese era and Indonesian occupation, where outside systems of governance were seen to be forcibly imposed on people and thus something to resist, or at least attempt to bypass. This could imply that for some, state law is broadly understood as legitimate at least until the point that it is seen as working against particular interests or needs. Then, whether the law needs to be adhered to or not comes into question. This is not an insignificant point for those interested in generalised law enforcement, and further research might for instance show a relationship between the high negative responses to Question Seven and a level of resentment held by some people in terms of perceived injustices over impunity, especially those directly related to the crisis.

There is also another way to think on the less than unequivocal answers to Question Six and Seven. During the post-independence state-building phase, government services, support and basic infrastructure have often remained minimal even in Dili. In the everyday realities of living in the capital, people mediate the development of a new modern state alongside customary forms of social regulation and negotiation (Brown 2013, 21), meaning that with different systems of governance in play, people have in effect different options or ways of regulating communities, a point explored for instance in the following question.

Q19. WHEN THERE ARE PROBLEMS IN YOUR COMMUNITY, IS TRADITIONAL LAW NORMALLY USED TO HELP RESOLVE IT?



Overall, 60.8 per cent of responses to Question Nineteen said that customary law was ‘Definitely’ used to help resolve problems in a person’s community in Dili. In comparison, only 15.0 per cent of respondents felt that customary law was ‘Definitely Not’ used to help resolve problems in their community. However, as this question did not ask on the preference of customary law over state law, the high rate of positive responses could also indicate a simultaneous use of modern and customary law.

This role for customary law has been identified in studies both prior to and since this survey was conducted. For instance, in some cases of gang-violence in Dili, a combination of *lisan* (such as *Tara Bandu*, a prohibitive arrangement used to regulate social relations or the use of natural resources; or *Juramentu*, a blood-oath taken by participants), local church and policing are all drawn together to resolve conflict.<sup>59</sup> Networks of security actors across various levels of society have also been useful in dealing with conflict.<sup>60</sup> As one example, during the crisis, a group of IDPs drew customary elders together to undertake a *Nahe Biti bo’ot* and *Juramentu* ceremony in order to foster longer term sustainability in reintegration efforts led by the Government (Trindade & Castro 2007, 26). Another report provides the example of a community in Bidau Santana (Cristo Rei, Dili) which modified their existing use of *Tara Bandu* in resolving domestic violence disputes by replacing a specific section

with the new Law against Domestic Violence (Belun 2013b, 29). Such acts have been identified by researchers such as Trindade and Castro (2007, 27) as demonstrating the value of customary practice in society.

It is also worth noting that where customary law is identified as playing a role in conflict resolution, it might be that the way resolution is undertaken resonates with customary practice, but is no longer customary in key respects. For instance, conflict resolution may occur through the incorporation of modern practices, but still draw on the form of customary practices by involving familial networks (rather than reducing the conflict to singular victim-perpetrator framing), giving space to extensive dialogue, and reaching points of compromise. As such, those involved in conflict may not necessarily be bound by a customary form of justice, but a residual sense of customary law may still shape and add a sense of familiarity to a process of conflict resolution, as the accompanying quote here suggests.


*“Customary Law is too old-fashioned. It is better to sit together, hold a dialogue and come to a resolution in accordance with the laws of today”*

- Respondent, Comoro

## Responsible authorities

Question Eighteen sought to gauge where the *preference* lay in a community in terms of authority structures, acknowledging for instance that any one dispute might actually see police involvement as well as *xefe suku*, or customary leaders such as the *lia-na'in*. The question did not, however, specify other forms of leadership that may hold importance for people, such as the Church.<sup>61</sup>

Q18. IF THERE IS A PROBLEM IN YOUR LOCAL COMMUNITY, DO PEOPLE PREFER TO CALL POLICE RATHER THAN THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO ASSIST ITS RESOLUTION?



Overall, calling police was preferred by over half of the respondents (59.3 per cent). However, a significant minority (33.8 per cent) also indicated a preference for calling on local authorities. Only 5.6 per cent responded neutrally and 1.4 per cent had no opinion, demonstrating that most people had a clear opinion either way. The concentration of security actors, notably police, in the capital would, we believe, influence people’s perceptions of police availability as well as perceptions of trust and confidence in the PNTL (Marx 2013, 14). Similarly, results from The Asia Foundation’s 2013 survey of community-policing perceptions show the potential of police proximity and presence, and the influence on perceptions of security and justice-seeking avenues, with 48.0 per cent of Dili respondents saying they would first report an incident to the police if there was a police station or officer located in their *suku*, and 43.0 saying they preferred community leaders (the national average favoured community



leaders by 10.0 per cent more).<sup>62</sup>

Across all survey sites the response option of 'Definitely Police' was the most common in terms of who people would prefer to call (Question 18). However, Lahane Oriental and Becora had slightly lower percentages of respondents who expressed this sentiment (46.6 per cent and 48.5 per cent, respectively). In addition, these two sites had the highest percentage of respondents who indicated that they would definitely prefer to call local authorities (29.8 per cent in Lahane Oriental and 35.6 per cent in Becora). In the reverse, sites such as Bairro Pite, which had the highest proportion of respondents answer 'Definitely Police' (68.4 per cent), also had the lowest proportion of respondents answer 'Definitely Local Authority' (9.5 per cent). This suggests that in some sites, local leadership structures may be more active and policing may not be as effective, or vice versa.

Question 18. If there is a problem in your local community, do people prefer to call police rather than the local authorities to assist its resolution?										
	Bairro Pite		Becora		Bemori		Comoro		Lahane Oriental	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
No opinion	1	0.6	0	0.0	2	1.3	4	2.4	4	2.5
Definitely (Local authorities)	15	9.5	58	35.6	37	23.3	27	16.1	48	29.8
Probably (Local authorities)	13	8.2	16	9.8	17	10.7	20	11.9	22	13.7
Neutral	10	6.3	5	3.1	10	6.3	11	6.5	7	4.3
Probably (Police)	11	7.0	5	3.1	10	6.3	11	6.5	7	4.3
Definitely (Police)	108	68.4	79	48.5	81	50.9	93	55.4	75	46.6
Total	158	100.0	163	100.0	159	100.0	168	100.0	161	100.0

In understanding the preference for calling on one form of authority over another, it is important to take into consideration various factors such as the nature and severity of the problem, a person's relationship to their community and corresponding leaders,<sup>63</sup> as well as past experiences of engagement with police and local authorities. People's perceptions of the PNTL, as well as local authorities, were impacted at different times and sites during the crisis and this may in turn affect people's own trust and preference for methods of conflict resolution. For example, some academic studies in the years following on from this survey note that at the time of the crisis, a number of community leaders were reported to have alienated sections of their community by becoming involved in or endorsing arson, looting and intimidation, while others gained more respect by demonstrating 'neutrality, protecting victims or through playing a mediation role' (Scambary 2013, 1942-43).<sup>64</sup> It is possible that the answers provided by respondents could be influenced by their experiences through the crisis with regards to policing or local authorities.

*"Now the lia-na'in and xefe-suku aren't brave enough to resolve [problems], because of the crisis. If they want to try and call the young people together, no one goes. The youth say 'the Government isn't doing anything to resolve things, so how do you, the xefe-suku or xefe-aldeia, think you are going to be able to resolve anything?'"*

Respondent, Golgota


As this quote suggests, the lack of resolution can impact both customary and modern forms of governance. Similarly, it may also be that some people identify the police as being the most capable body in terms of an immediate response and diffusion of a violent situation (or to minimise or halt potential escalation), as demonstrated by one respondent who said that *"now, because local*

leaders are not armed, they cannot help you and that is why people would call the police.”<sup>65</sup> Another respondent from Comoro stated that if it was a big problem like someone carrying a weapon, then it was necessary to call the police.<sup>66</sup> These responses reflect that for some people, confidence in police capacity is linked to showing greater force and availability of weaponry, which is consistent with trends identified elsewhere that suggest that some East Timorese support more ‘physically robust’ styles of policing because it makes them feel safer (Burgess 2012, 15).

*“It depends on the situation – if it is not really serious you can resolve it yourselves, but if it is serious then you call the police”*  
Respondent, Bemori

*“You go through local leaders first to resolve a problem. If they are unable to fix the problem, then you make a formal complaint to the police”*  
Respondent, Bemori


Q24. IF A REALLY BIG PROBLEM OCCURS IN YOUR COMMUNITY,  
DO PEOPLE NORMALLY CALL THE POLICE?




As Grenfell *et al* note, for many people there is a clear acknowledgement of ‘the kinds of crimes or conflicts that can be dealt with in the *aldeia*, and those in which need to be directed towards state authorities’ (Grenfell *et al* 2009, 117).<sup>67</sup> Lesser offences (also termed as ‘civil’ or ‘minor’) are generally regarded as arguments or property disputes, whereas ‘serious’ offences (also termed as ‘criminal’) tend to be those that involve murder, rape or assault until the victim is bleeding.<sup>68</sup> For urban Dili, Question Twenty Four—which asked people whether ‘they would normally call the police if a really big problem occurred’—sought to gauge the willingness of community members to engage the police force in the face of a serious threat. An overwhelming number of respondents (84.9 per cent) said that people would ‘Definitely’ call the police in the event of a significant problem in their community, in comparison to only 3.7 per cent who said they would ‘Definitely Not’.

Question Twenty Seven (a) asked respondents whether, over the past year, they or their family had been victims of crime. On the basis of these results, Question Twenty-Seven (b) asked from those who answered ‘Yes’ (23.2 per cent) whether they had reported the incident to the police. Of the 23.2 per cent of people who said that either they or their family had been victims of a crime in the past year, 83.8 per cent said they had reported it to the police.

Q27a. OVER THE LAST YEAR, HAVE YOU OR YOUR FAMILY BEEN VICTIMS OF CRIME?



Q27b. IF YES, DID YOU TELL THE POLICE OR NOT?




For Question 27a, Comoro had the lowest percentage of respondents (76.2 per cent) who said that they had told the police when they or a family member had been victimised in the past year. This contrasted with answers to earlier questions where responses in Comoro elicited some of the highest percentages of positive responses relating to a preference for police involvement in problems. For instance, when asked if they would prefer to call police rather than local authorities to assist in the resolution of problems (Question 18), 55.4 per cent of respondents in Comoro said they 'Definitely' preferred to call police. With the exception of Bairro Pite, this was the highest percentage of respondents who communicated a definite preference for police, and was also higher than the total average of all sites (5.3.9 per cent). Similarly, when asked if people would normally call the police if a really big problem occurred in the community (Question 24), Comoro had the highest percentage of respondents (88.7 per cent) who answered 'Definitely Yes'. Again, this was higher than the total average of all sites (84.9 per cent). This contrast in responses could be explained in different ways, and may suggest that there is a difference in the way that people have theoretically responded to the previous questions (framed in the context of 'if') in comparison to how they have responded when asked about a real life occurrence. A similar point is also made in The Asia Foundation's 2013 survey on community policing perceptions, where they tested hypothetical reactions to real actions of respondents in dealing with problems. Results showed that despite thinking that they would first seek assistance from the PNTL, in most cases, the *xefe suku* or *xefe aldeia* were the first point of contact (Wassel & Rajalingam 2014, 65: See Table 6.4).

## V. ATTITUDES ON SECURITY PROVISION

### Policing

Question Twenty-Five asked respondents to comment on whether, if the police are called, they dealt with problems better than in the past? The question was asked in terms of police coming into communities for law enforcement purposes. Nearly three quarters of people surveyed felt that PNTL's capacity for dealing with problems had improved (73.7 per cent; 12.3 per cent responding 'Probably Yes' and 61.4 per cent responding 'Definitely Yes'). Of course the 'past' is more general than the crisis, and the PNTL has been evolving as an institution since independence. However the results appear to confirm that the national police force was at least improving in terms of public perceptions when this survey was undertaken in 2011.<sup>69</sup>



In contrast only 6.6 per cent did not agree that the police dealt with problems better than in the past (3.5 per cent answering ‘Definitely Not’ and 3.1 per cent thought ‘Probably Not’). There was, however, a significant percentage of people who gave a neutral response (18.3 per cent). The cumulative value of providing no response, a negative response or neutral response (26.0 per cent) means that just over a quarter of respondents were unable or unwilling to endorse a perceived improvement in police capacity and competency.

While there was little variation between sites for Question Twenty Five, Bairro Pite elicited the highest percentage (64.6 per cent) of people that felt that police ‘Definitely’ dealt with problems better than in the past. This is consistent with the site’s high results in response to Question Eighteen and Twenty Four regarding preferences for police involvement when problems occur in the community.<sup>70</sup> This may suggest that police were better established within this *suku* and had improved relationships with community members compared to in the past.

Aside from the responses establishing a strong sense of improvement, the challenge in interpreting the results of this question any further is that it is difficult to gauge what is meant by ‘improvement’ beyond a sense of competency and efficiency in law enforcement. A number of other research sources point toward the historical and cultural context of policing models during the Portuguese and Indonesian occupation as contributing to ‘Timorese thinking about development of the security sector ...[has been...] greatly influenced by authoritarian styles’ (Wilson 2009, 13).<sup>71</sup> With the creation of several highly armed ‘specialised forces’,<sup>72</sup> it could be that people’s perceptions of improvement are influenced by the idea that ‘dealing with a problem’ is most effectively undertaken via a more forceful military style of policing (Jütersonke *et al* 2010, 60). For example, while some people may think of improved police capacity in terms of refraining from the use of excessive force, or more awareness of human rights, others may associate it with the force that is required to ensure that people are too frightened to commit crime,<sup>73</sup> thereby having the same result of contributing to a perceived level of security and stability in the community or city.<sup>74</sup>

Question Twenty-Six asked people if ‘in general, do you think that police resolve conflicts in a neutral way or not?’. Only slightly more than half of the respondents answered positively (44.9 per cent answered ‘Definitely Yes’ and 8.8 per cent answered ‘Probably Yes’). This question also elicited one of the highest neutral responses (32.8 per cent) which could be taken as some people not wanting to affirm the neutrality of the police, while equally not wanting to risk any kind of recrimination for suggesting something negative. Another factor influencing the way people responded on the question of police neutrality could be that approaches to policing are dependent on the individual police officers

involved,<sup>75</sup> or that families may call upon relatives who are police to get involved in disputes, a view that could well impact people's perceptions of PNTL neutrality (De Sousa C. Belo & Koenig 2011, 25).



## The state


Question Thirty-Two sought to understand how positively the state was viewed in relation to its response to the crisis. It generated mixed responses with only slightly more than half of the respondents answering positively (43.3 per cent were 'Definitely' satisfied with how the state had responded, and 10.5 per cent said 'Probably'). Cumulatively, 24.0 per cent of people gave a negative response (13.9 per cent felt 'Definitely Not' and 10.1 per cent felt 'Probably Not') while 19.4 per cent gave a neutral response.

Broadly framed, the question sought an opinion on community views, with short interviews giving a sense of the reasons as to why. As per the quote here, people's responses could be based on a whole range of factors; the extent and levels to which they received social assistance, that others received assistance but they had not,<sup>76</sup> or other reasons such as the experience of violence as a result of strained or failed reintegration efforts (Van der Auweraert 2012, 10),<sup>77</sup> connection to one of the various political groupings (such as those within the military, police, ministries, political parties, martial arts groups)<sup>78</sup> and so on. One respondent in Bemori said that many people were angry because the state did not respond quickly enough to people's necessities.<sup>79</sup> Such a view could be a reflection of the fact that the National Recovery Strategy did not come into effect until December 2007 (Bishop 2012, 10), and that most of the immediate emergency response focused on setting up IDP camps and the provision of humanitarian aid to those within the camps (Van der Auweraert 2012, 21). This was further exacerbated by problems with the allocation of the Cash Recovery Grant Scheme.<sup>80</sup>

Of the respondents who gave negative or neutral responses in interviews, some hinted toward unresolved issues or political leadership not fully comprehending the long-term impacts of their decisions.<sup>81</sup> Some reports from the time claim that the 'rushed nature of the IDP return process, which might appear to have been initially successful, has left many wounds unhealed' (Muggah & LeBrun 2010, 35). This can be seen for instance with ongoing land titling disputes, making it hard for


resettlement when ownership is contested. While the Government has acknowledged this difficulty, in the end it was argued that it was unviable to ‘concentrate scarce resources’ on clarifying land rights which would have taken ‘years of complex work, legislative measures and additional resources not available at the time’ (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2009, 12).

Q32. IN GENERAL, DO YOU THINK THAT PEOPLE ARE SATISFIED WITH HOW THE CRISIS HAS BEEN RESPONDED TO BY THE STATE?



Question Twenty-Two aimed at understanding the degree to which the state had contributed to ensuring peace in people’s local communities. This question was again broadly framed and aimed at understanding how the state may have been able to impact local communities in a meaningful way; whether that be through the closure of camps, the distribution of assistance, job creation, re-building infrastructure, and so on. People responded positively, with nearly three quarters of people surveyed (71.0 per cent) responding with either ‘Probably Yes’ or ‘Definitely Yes’. Still, 15.2 per cent of people do not believe the state has helped to ensure peace in their community. 11.1 per cent of people were ‘Neutral’ and 2.7 per cent had no opinion.

Q22. DO YOU THINK THAT SINCE THE CRISIS THE STATE HAS HELPED ENSURE PEACE IN YOUR COMMUNITY OR NOT?




### External involvement: Security agents

Regarding the presence of external forces, Question Thirty was a value question which sought to understand how people balanced the preservation of sovereignty with the need for security. Overall,

people felt positively about the presence of foreign forces (50.7 per cent thought it was 'Definitely Good' and 10.6 per cent thought it was 'Probably Good'). A small but significant minority elected to respond that the foreign security presence was 'Definitely Not Good' (15.5 per cent) with another 8.2 per cent saying that the presence was 'Probably Not Good'.


Q30. DO YOU THINK IT IS GOOD THAT THERE ARE PEOPLE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN PROVIDING SECURITY INSIDE TIMOR-LESTE?



*"I feel that it is really good that foreigners came to help provide security in our country. During the crisis, people from Australia, New Zealand, Portugal and other countries came and helped us. The Defence force and Police may not like them, but they still need to cooperate and receive training so that we can defend and maintain security in our country by ourselves"*

Respondent, Bemori

Interview responses provided some insight as to why people may have answered positively or negatively. For those that felt negatively, they expressed that they felt Timor-Leste was being taken advantage of.<sup>82</sup> Positive responses were based on a more pragmatic understanding that there was a need to develop the national security sector to the extent that there was an ability to maintain security independently. In the context of widespread public disorder and violence, any organisation that was able to contribute to stability represented a benefit, and often a neutral outsider would be better at finding a resolution to a problem as it would remove the issue of family or personal connections.<sup>83</sup>




Overall, responses to Question Twenty-Eight and Question Twenty-Nine showed very little differentiation between people’s perceptions of UNPOL and ISF’s contribution to security in Dili.<sup>84</sup> A significant majority of people had positive perceptions of UNPOL (53.6 per cent said ‘Definitely Positive’, and 10.4 per cent said ‘Probably Positive’). Similarly, 54.4 per cent answered ‘Definitely Positive’ and 9.3 per cent answered ‘Probably Positive’ in regards to ISF. For the approximate 10.0 per cent who felt that both UNPOL and the ISF had had a negative effect, this may well have related to their inability to stem violence for a long period of time<sup>85</sup> or the particular style of policing that came with foreign police forces.<sup>86</sup>

A perceived lack of competency and effectiveness in dealing with violence during the crisis could have also been a contributing factor to some people’s views with regards to UNPOL or ISF having a negative impact on security.<sup>87</sup> UNPOL was criticised for its poor communication and language skills (CIGI 2009, 6; ICG 2009, 9; Svoboda & Davey 2013, 17), and both UNPOL and ISF suffered a lack of local knowledge hindering its effectiveness (Lemay-Hébert 2009, 396; Goldsmith 2009, 125). Furthermore, although being the first on the ground, the ISF faced significant challenges in preventing and responding to public disorder, severely impacting upon public opinions. Lack of equipment and weaponry, military strength and geographical knowledge all meant that the ISF would arrive too late to prevent incidents, or be outnumbered and unable to control large crowds, further contributing to the displacement of people. As Goldsmith writes, ‘such early displays of impotence ... augured badly for subsequent efforts at building local confidence’ (Goldsmith 2009, 124).

## Non-governmental organisations

With the paralysis of significant parts of the state over 2006, many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) took on peacebuilding programs in Dili, providing humanitarian assistance, material support, leadership training, and youth-related activities in sites across Dili. In answering Question Twenty-Three as to whether organisations played a role in supporting peace in people’s communities since the crisis, the responses were quite mixed. Only a little over half of the people surveyed responded positively (48.8 per cent feeling that organisations had ‘Definitely’ helped to create peace and 7.6 per cent feeling that they ‘Probably’ had helped).

Q23. DO YOU THINK THAT SINCE THE CRISIS OTHER ORGANISATIONS HAVE HELPED TO CREATE PEACE IN YOUR COMMUNITY?



People’s perceptions of the role of NGOs were slightly less positive than those of forces responsible for security,<sup>88</sup> a point which may relate, in part, to how security can be experienced in a more



immediate sense. In contrast, peacebuilding programs can take far longer to have an effect and it is harder to draw a one-to-one correlation between an actor's ability to contribute to a peace. Overall, the results reflect that respondents were emphatic in answering that other organisations had either 'Definitely Not' helped (23.5 per cent) or had 'Definitely' helped (48.8 per cent). All other responses garnered relatively low percentages in comparison, suggesting that people had either a very good or very bad experience with NGOs. There was not much variation between sites, however Bemori and Lahane Oriental had a noticeably lower percentage of respondents who answered 'Definitely Yes' (43.4 per cent and 45.3 per cent, respectively). While geographic location may explain the lower positive responses to this question in Lahane Oriental—in terms of proximity to NGO offices or projects—the same cannot be said for Bemori which is close to the capital's centre. Bemori also had the highest percentage of people who said that other organisations had 'Definitely Not' helped to create peace (27.0 per cent), which may mean that a significant minority of respondents had had a negative experience or that there were enduring problems in the community (CDA 2008, 12).

Question 23. Do you think that since the crisis other organisations have helped to create peace in your community?										
	Bairro Pite		Becora		Bemori		Comoro		Lahane Oriental	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
No opinion	6	3.8	5	3.1	5	3.1	11	6.6	4	2.5
Definitely not	34	21.3	37	23.3	43	27.0	38	22.8	37	23.0
Probably not	2	1.3	9	5.7	10	6.3	9	5.4	17	10.6
Neutral	20	12.5	18	11.3	23	14.5	11	6.6	12	7.5
Probably yes	15	9.4	10	6.3	9	5.7	9	5.4	18	11.2
Definitely yes	81	50.6	80	50.3	69	43.4	89	53.3	73	45.3
Total	158	100.0	159	100.0	159	100.0	167	100.0	161	100.0

One factor that could have influenced why some respondents answered positively is the large number of Catholic relief and aid agencies.<sup>89</sup> An influential institution, the Church played a particularly important role during the Indonesian occupation when 'church activities were one of the few activities which enabled East Timorese to gather together in a spirit of solidarity and sharing, as many customary events were banned during the occupation' (Brown 2013, 12).<sup>90</sup> It is possible that some of the respondents were more familiar with organisations that had a religious affiliation, such as the respondent below:

*"Help came from the NGO CRS (Catholic Relief Services) and also one Padre (Catholic Priest) with good morals."*

- Respondent, Becora

*"Yes [NGOs helped to create peace], like the Church"*

- Respondent, Comoro

Grove *et al* (2007, 28) notes how the Church, through their priests and peace workshops have helped to create a sense of peace by binding youth together through a reminder of solidarity and the rhetoric of 'Timor ida de'it' (Just one Timor). One respondent claimed that because there were no other organisations that provided support, those who were displaced went to the Church (for refuge and social assistance).<sup>91</sup> This response also suggests that some respondents may have interpreted the question in terms of the immediate period of the crisis, rather than peacebuilding projects beyond that time.


Lothe and Peake (2010, 435) have also argued that the post-crisis model of development continued

to be that of ‘public sector development programmes and a heavy emphasis on imparting ‘capacity’ through technical assistance’. As such, it makes sense that for some, the impact and results of these efforts would not necessarily or neatly translate to creating ‘peace’ at a community level. Equally, the methods by which some NGOs operationalised their peacebuilding projects could also have impacted how respondents answered this question. In terms of responding to the large-scale youth violence that occurred during the crisis, one source writes how workshops as the ‘primary medium’ were actually counter-productive, causing ‘recipient fatigue’ with the aid community wanting to ‘workshop people to death’ (Arnold 2009, 385).

## VI. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Across the five sites, electronic means of obtaining information about the security situation in Dili were the most favoured, in contrast with low preference for human sources (15.8 per cent).<sup>92</sup> Cumulatively, electronic sources of information represented 80.4 per cent of peoples’ responses (67.0 per cent of respondents said television and 13.4 per cent said radio).<sup>93</sup> This ranking was the same across all five sites, with the exception of Bemori, where police were the second most identified source of information (10.7 per cent).

Q17. WHERE DO YOU GET YOUR INFORMATION ABOUT THE SECURITY SITUATION IN DILI FROM?



These results are generally indicative of a different level of mass media integration in Dili in comparison to many rural areas due to higher regularity of electricity and access to purchasable goods such as televisions (with the presence of cash incomes and relatively higher cash flows) in Dili (Toome *et al* 2012, 20). Timor-Leste’s 2010 Population Census records 44,767 households which owned a television nationally with some 23,520 in Dili alone, or just over 50.0 per cent of the national total (National Statistics Directorate 2010, 452-454).

The relatively low selection of newspapers as a source of information is notable, not least in that in


Dili, distribution of and access to newspapers is far more extensive than in other districts and also in the context of our survey respondents where 91.7 per cent declared Tetun literacy (85.5 per cent said they 'know how to read and write', and 6.2 per cent said they know 'a little')<sup>94</sup> compared to a national rate of 56.1 per cent (80.9 per cent of urban areas, 44.6 per cent of rural areas) (ibid, xvii). However, as noted by Toome *et al*, some people may hold a 'distrust towards print press', either out of disagreement with the content, or due to a 'greater trust for forms of media where [they] could see the face or hear the voice of those making the commentary' (Toome *et al* 2012, 23).

The very low preference for 'family' (2.2 per cent) and 'friends/neighbours (not family)' (1.7 per cent) as a source of information on security issues was surprising given the amount of information that appears to be passed between people on the street and between houses, or for instance on transport. This may have increased had the question been asked about security in a person's community. As the question asks with regards to security in Dili more generally, then given the size of the capital it makes some sense that media would play an important role in informing people.

## VII. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

Questions Thirty-One, Thirty-Three, Thirty-Four and Thirty-Five sought to understand peoples' sense of the future in light of the issues that led to the 2006 crisis; would tensions persist, including into the 2012 elections, and could a situation like the crisis occur again? Both survey results and interviews demonstrated a clear link between people's opinion of the future being dependent on strong and united leadership. Across all sites, these four questions elicited the highest percentage of neutral responses, possibly indicating a degree of uncertainty or hesitation regarding the future.

Q31. DO YOU THINK THAT THE PROBLEMS THAT MADE THE CRISIS OCCUR HAVE BEEN RESOLVED OR NOT?




Question Thirty-One asked people if they thought that the problems that made the crisis occur had been resolved. This question elicited mixed results, with no single answer recording much more than a third of the total (33.5 per cent answered 'Definitely Yes' and in turn 12.3 per cent answered 'Probably Yes'). A total of 21.7 per cent felt the issues had 'definitely not' been resolved, and 10.5 per cent thought that issues were 'Probably Not' resolved. A large number of respondents selected 'Neutral' as a response (17.1 per cent), while 4.9 per cent of people had no opinion.

Comoro was the only location with positive results over 50.0 per cent when counted cumulatively (50.6 per cent with 'Probably Yes' and 'Definitely Yes' combined). This was matched by the lowest percentage of people who answered negatively (23.3 per cent). While Lahane Oriental elicited the highest percentage of respondents who felt that the problems that made the crisis had 'Definitely Not' been resolved in comparison to the other four sites (30.0 per cent), it also had the highest percentage of positive responses to questions regarding their feelings of security in their community and Dili, and also as to whether people felt more secure than in comparison to five years ago (at the time of the 2006 crisis).<sup>95</sup> These results suggest two things; firstly, that the sense of resolution was far from uniform; and secondly, that in each research site, particularly Lahane Oriental, respondents have been able to maintain a level of stability and resilience that is able to contain (or mitigate) conflict, even though for many there are unresolved tensions that remain from the crisis.

Interviews shed further light on some of the reasons informing the way respondents answered the survey, with the state deeply implicated in people's opinions of whether issues from the crisis had been resolved. For those who gave negative responses, the underlying themes were on perceptions of impunity regarding the crimes committed in 2006<sup>96</sup> and the unfairness of social assistance policies (in terms of the Government cash recovery grant scheme); for example, houses not having been fixed despite it being registered and inspected already.<sup>97</sup>

Generally, responses to Question Thirty-Five were in the negative, with 54.5 per cent of responses indicating they do not think a crisis like 2006 could occur again in Dili (35.7 per cent thought 'Definitely Not' and 18.8 per cent thought 'Probably Not'). However, a significant number of respondents agreed that something similar could occur again, with 19.6 per cent of people responding either 'Probably' or 'Definitely Yes'. Again, a relatively high rate of respondents were 'Neutral' on the issue (19.4 per cent), suggesting a difficulty in predicting how things might unfold in the future, while 6.6 per cent had no opinion.

Q35. DO YOU THINK THAT A CRISIS LIKE 2006 COULD OCCUR AGAIN IN DILI?




Residents in Lahane Oriental showed the lowest level of positive answers with only 25.5 per cent of people indicating that they 'Definitely' did not think a crisis like 2006 could occur again. In comparison, responses from Bairro Pite and Comoro were significantly higher (42.1 per cent and 44.0 per cent, respectively). Neutral responses were quite high in Becora (22.2 per cent) and Bemori (23.9 per cent). Both Lahane Oriental and Comoro's results are consistent with Question Thirty One (discussed above)—which asked whether people thought issues from the crisis had been resolved—in that Lahane Oriental had the highest rate of respondents who felt that issues had 'Definitely Not' been resolved (30.0 per cent), and Comoro had the highest cumulative percentage of people who felt that

the issues had been resolved (50.6 per cent). This suggests that for some people, there is perhaps the sense of a connection between what has not yet been resolved, and how those issues could potentially retrigger another crisis.

Across all sites, responses to Question Thirty-Three regarding the forthcoming 2012 National Elections were very mixed. This elicited a high proportion of neutral responses (22.3 per cent), and nearly a third of people surveyed (31.7 per cent) agreed that there may be conflict with the coming elections, with 16.7 per cent stating definitively that there will be conflict.

Q33. DO YOU WORRY THAT THERE WILL BE CONFLICT WITH THE ELECTION NEXT YEAR OR NOT?



A slightly higher number of people indicated that they did not believe there would be conflict leading to the elections (21.3 per cent said 'Definitely Not'; 16.7 per cent said 'Probably Not') and 8.9 per cent of respondents did not have an opinion.

In nearly all surveyed sites, neutral responses constituted a significant portion of results, as high as 24.4 per cent in Bairro Pite. Only 16.5 per cent of residents surveyed in Becora and 16.1 per cent in Lahane Oriental were 'Definitely Not' worried that there would be conflict with the elections next year. A further 21.1 per cent in Lahane Oriental said they were 'Probably Not' worried. The highest percentage of people who expressed that they were 'Definitely' worried about further conflict was in Comoro at 19.0 per cent, however this was not significantly higher than any of the other surveyed sites.

Despite tension in the lead-up to the Presidential elections in 2012,<sup>98</sup> the elections were conducted in a relatively peaceful manner. This was largely attributed to public displays of 'goodwill' between political figures (RSIS 2012, 2), in contrast to the high number of threats and acts of intimidation between political party supporters in the 2007 elections (Vyavaharkar 2009, 3). This sentiment was reflected in the short interviews accompanying this survey, with responses such as "*there won't be conflict if the leaders prioritise national development*"<sup>99</sup> or that there could be conflict if leaders only followed their own policies and did not "*work together to bring the nation to peace.*"<sup>100</sup> Another factor that would have been an issue was the forthcoming withdrawal of UNMIT. Given the relatively positive perceptions of UNPOL's impact discussed earlier, the mixed results may reflect a level of apprehensiveness by respondents given that the UN's withdrawal would follow the elections.


*"With firm leadership, the nation can develop with peace."*  
Respondent, Bemori

*"[Peace] will depend on the upcoming elections. The elections means new plans and budgets for development. We need to develop with peace, if we don't have peace then we can't have progress"*

Respondent, Comoro

In response to Question Thirty-Four, generally the majority of people surveyed thought that Dili would develop peacefully over the next five years, with 66.2 per cent of people responding either 'Probably Yes' or 'Definitely Yes'. In contrast, only 11.1 per cent of people did not think this would be the case (5.4 per cent thought 'Definitely Not' and 5.7 per cent thought 'Probably Not'). A higher percentage of people did, however, respond neutrally (18.6 per cent). This suggests that while a solid majority of people are generally positive about the future of development of Dili, people were still cautious.<sup>101</sup> This caution was generally discussed in the context of the role of politicians, as demonstrated by the quotes below.

Q34. DO YOU THINK THAT DILI WILL DEVELOP PEACEFULLY  
OVER THE NEXT 5 YEARS?



*"In my opinion, [Dili will develop peacefully] as long as the leaders are hakmatek [peaceful; calm], then the people will be too"*

-Respondent, Bairro Pite

*"It depends on the Government.....if we don't compete with each other over kadeira [positions within Government] they will not incite the people and everything will be okay, but if they do then the people will han malu [fight each other]"*

Respondent, Bemori

*"We need to look at our political leaders and the way they used manipulation in 2006. If this doesn't happen, development will happen because the new Government will be able to sit together and discuss development"*

- Respondent, Comoro

Across most sites however, there was still a small yet significant minority of the 'Neutral' responses (for instance, a little over 20.0 per cent of residents in Bairro Pite responded neutrally). Between the survey sites, there was roughly only a five per cent variance of those that were definitive in saying that Dili would develop peacefully over the next five years; the lowest being Becora (40.9 per cent) and the highest being Lahane Oriental (48.8 per cent). Another 19.4 per cent said 'Probably Yes', meaning that 68.2 per cent of people in Lahane Oriental hold positive prospects for Dili's future development. This appears to contradict somewhat with Lahane Oriental's results for Question Thirty Five, which demonstrated the lowest proportion of respondents in comparison to the other survey sites who

felt that a crisis like 2006 could 'Definitely Not' occur again (25.5 per cent). This suggests that while optimism may have been a factor for the way some people responded, there still appeared to be a level of caution in some people's assessment of the future state of peace and security in the capital.

## VIII. CONCLUSION

Based on the survey results and accompanying interviews, in addition to more recent studies conducted since 2011, the conclusion of this report provides a summary of key findings which include some initial comments on gaps in research, followed by a separate list of research recommendations.

### Key findings

- While security can be seen to have improved in a general sense, both within communities as well as across Dili more generally, the survey shows that this HAS remained uneven. People were by and large willing to give a very positive sense of their communities in terms of security and peace, though survey responses still identified groups of people for whom insecurity was still clearly prevalent. More research needs to go into identifying who these groups of people are, circumstances or situations that make them more vulnerable or susceptible, the conditions in which statements of being secure are unmatched by perceived realities, and why; and based on this, how policies can be developed to address their vulnerabilities and needs in terms of security.
- In Dili, security is in part reproduced by drawing together different systems of governance in the managing of conflict and insecurity. This can be seen in the way that people call upon a range of actors and authorities in the resolution of disputes, and the methods in which they are resolved which draw upon the modern legal system (and protection mechanisms through police), as well as through approaches involving dialogue and mediation. Furthermore, in Dili there appears to be an increasing reliance (or trust) in police presence and response as well as in police ability to prevent or impede further escalation of violence. One area which requires further examination, and could be an area of concern for those advocating for particular forms of policing, is the rate at which interview responses regarded the importance of a 'showing of force' as an important factor in people's perceptions of security provision.
- Post-crisis, there seems to be evidence of a significant level of social resilience at the local level, evidenced by an ability for communities to play an active part in the constitution of their own security. This resilience in part stems from the point above regarding security being generated across multiple levels, and thus approaches to security sector and policing reform as well as conflict resolution mechanisms should take account of this. Furthermore, the importance of social cohesiveness and integration at the community level must not be underestimated as a prominent factor influencing the extent to which an individual or family may or may not feel safe in their neighbourhood.
- In a practical sense, the state has been able to re-establish itself post-crisis to a not so insignificant degree, including through policing mechanisms. While policing may often be contested in various ways, there appears to be a generalised acceptance of policing as one part of security provision with society. However, as mentioned previously, while this may be the case in Dili, it may not be a very apt description of the reality of more rural areas where police presence and resources are significantly lower. As pointed out by some interviewees in this report, police stations and officers are often very far away from people's communities, and so the extent of security provision by police in Dili must be distinguished to that outside of urban centres. Indeed, responses showed that many people felt a higher degree of safety in Dili because of the proximity to security forces.

- While the state has in some respects seen to have maintained or re-built a degree of legitimacy post-crisis, there is a level to which people remain circumspect of their relationship to the state more generally. This is evidenced by a range of answers to questions across the survey, including in regards to people's relationship to the law, as well in the *Looking to the Future* section and views of the state's capacity to ensure future security and stability.

## Recommendations for future research

Given these key findings, this report proposes the following recommendations for directions for future research regarding security sector development—as well as the nature of conflict and violence more broadly—in Timor-Leste. Integrated into all of these following recommendations should be a focus on the difference between urban and rural environments, and how to manage research and subsequent policies that will be most effective in addressing the issues and characteristics of both contexts:

- Research should acknowledge layers to society, understanding that cultures and historical-social contexts play a role in (i) the reproduction of security, (ii) perceptions of security and (iii) forms of social resilience in the face of insecurity and violence.
- There are still misunderstandings of violence in the context of Timor-Leste, and we recommend building a more in-depth foundation of understanding as to the causes, triggers, typologies, modalities and subjectivities of violence. This is imperative in order to produce in depth accounts of how and why violence for instance is understood, and that which recognises the intricate layers to conflict and tension that can lead toward acts of violence and subsequently a sense of insecurity.
- Relating to the previously mentioned point about vulnerability, further research must be conducted into recognising who and why certain people face higher levels of violence and insecurity. Through research that for instance focuses on vulnerability in relation to risk and insecurity, it would be possible to extend that understanding to who is more susceptible to violence and why, and who may in effect be isolated from the patterns of resilience and security identified in this report. A gendered analysis of insecurity may be one way to achieve this, but would not account for or give a full scope in terms of why, when and how people feel vulnerable, either to immediate familial violence, or other forms of societal violence. Other themes to include could be;
  - Cultural practices and social norms;
  - Urban and rural differences;
  - Inter-generational differences;
  - Social and/or economic circumstances that impact risk, as well as;
  - Class and education.
- Future research on policing in Timor-Leste could focus on locally defined criteria and standards of what constitutes 'effective' policing. This also means looking at the extent to which police presence **actually** contributes to people's sense of safety in their community based on police duty and response capacity, rather than an understanding that the presence of police inhibits acts of crimes or violence out of fear of police violence. Furthermore, while having established the many variables that are constitutive of how communities deal with problems and who they approach ('big' and 'small' problems, 'civil' and 'criminal' offences), further research, building on this information, can contribute to looking at how different authorities work together in the resolution of disputes (differentiating between urban and rural contexts). This would also involve looking at, in more depth, how customary law is applied in the context of 'multi-layered justice', particularly on the value and outcome, rather than just a recognition of use.



# BIBLIOGRAPHY

7 December 2002 Joint Statement of Civil Society Organisations in Timor Lorosa'e 2002, *Never Sacrifice People for Political Ambition*, available via <http://www.easttimorlawandjusticebulletin.com/2008/12/unmiset-report-on-4-december-2002-civil.html>, viewed 4 September 2014.

Arnold, Matthew B. 2009, "'Who is my friend, who is my enemy?'" Youth and statebuilding in Timor-Leste', *International Peacekeeping*, 16(3): 379—392.

Belun 2009, *Reducing community tensions through housing*, Policy Brief, Dili.

Belun 2011, *Conflict Potential Analysis of Timor-Leste Trimester VI: October 2010 – January 2011*, Dili.

Belun 2013a, *Early Warning Early Response mapping system*, available via <https://belun.crowdmap.com/reports/view/615>, viewed 7 June 2014.

Belun 2013b, *Effective use of Tara Bandu to prevent conflict in Timor-Leste*, Policy Brief no. 7, Dili.

Belun 2013d, *EWER Alert: Televised debate between Prime Minister Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao and Sr. Mauk Moruk*, Dili.

Belun 2013e, *Early Warning Early Response mapping system*, available via <https://belun.crowdmap.com/reports/view/1019>, viewed 7 June 2014.

Belun 2013f, *Early Warning Early Response mapping system*, available via <https://belun.crowdmap.com/reports/view/1075>, viewed 7 June 2014.

Belun 2014a, *Monitoring results: Parliamentary Resolution No° 5/2014: Against CRM & CPD-RDTL*, Dili.

Belun 2014b, *Dynamics of martial arts related conflict and violence in Timor-Leste*, Research Report, Dili.

Belun 2014c, *Conflict Potential Analysis of Timor-Leste Trimester XIV: June – September 2013*, Dili.

Benini, Aldo 2009, *Tracking violence in Timor-Leste: A sample of emergency room data, 2006—08*, Issue Brief N° 4, Timor-Leste Armed Violence assessment, Dili.

Bishop, Jo-Anne 2012, *The National Recovery Strategy: A review of the process, results and lessons learnt*, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Dili.

Brady, Cynthia *et al* 2006, *The Crisis in Timor-Leste: Causes, Consequences and options for Conflict Management and Mitigation*, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Dili.

Braithwaite, John, Hilary Charlesworth and Adérito Soares 2012, *Networked governance of tyranny and freedom: peace in Timor-Leste*, Australian National University, Canberra.

Brown, Anne M. 2013, *Timor-Leste Report: Addressing legitimacy issues in fragile post-conflict situations to advance conflict transformation and peacebuilding*, University of Queensland, Brisbane.

Bubandt, Nils 2005, 'Vernacular Security: The politics of feeling safe in global, national and local words', *Security Dialogue*, 36(3): 275-296.

Bugalski, Natalie 2010, *Post conflict housing reconstruction and the right to adequate housing in Timor-Leste: An analysis of the response to the crisis of 2006 and 2007*, Inclusive Development International, Calabasas.

Burgess, Patrick 2012, *Vulnerable groups and security in Timor-Leste: An overview*, The North South Institute, Ottawa.

Carapic, Jovana and Oliver Jütersonke 2012, *Understanding the tipping point of urban conflict: the case of Dili, Timor-Leste*, Working Paper N°4, Urban Tipping Point (University of Manchester), Manchester.

CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 2008, *Listening Project: Field Visit Report – Timor-Leste*, Dili.

Chopra, Tanja, Susan Pologruto and Timotio de Deus 2009, *Fostering justice in Timor-Leste: Rule of law program*

*evaluation*, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Dili.

CHR (United Nations Commission on Human Rights) 1999, Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in East Timor, E/CN.4/S-4/CRP.1 (17 September 1999), available via <http://undocs.org/E/CN.4/S-4/CRP.1>.

CHR (United Nations Commission on Human Rights) 2000, *Profiles in Displacement: East Timor: Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Mr. Francis M. Deng, to the Commission on Human Rights in accordance with Commission resolution 1999/2-4/1 of 27 September 1999*, E/CN.4/2000/83/Add.3 (6 April 2000), available via <http://undocs.org/E/CN.4/2000/83>.

Dale, Pamela, Kristen Himelein, Denis Nikitin and Angie Bexley 2010, *Youth perspectives on Community, Trust, and Conflict*, Briefing Paper, 5(2), World Bank, Dili.

Devant, Sara Gonzalez 2008, *Displacement in the 2006 Dili Crisis: Dynamics of an ongoing conflict*, RSC Working Paper No. 45, Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford, University of Oxford.

Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2009, *Internal evaluation of Hamutuk Hari'i Futuru—lessons learnt and recommendations (draft)*, Dili.

Everett, Silas 2008, *Law and justice in East Timor: A survey of citizen awareness and attitudes regarding law and justice in East Timor*, The Asia Foundation, Dili.

Fundasaun Mahein 2014, *Fundasaun Mahein congratulates PNTL on the execution of the Parliamentary Resolution*, <http://www.fundasaunmahein.org/2014/03/18/fundasaun-mahein-kongratula-pntl-iha-ezekusaun-rezolutusaun-parlamentu-nasional/>, viewed 7 June 2014.

Galtung, Johan 1969, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research', *Journal of Peace Research*, 6(3): 167-191.

Graydon, Carolyn 2005, 'Local justice systems in Timor-Leste: Washed up, or watch this space?', *Development Bulletin*, 68: 66—70.

Grenfell, Damian and Bronwyn Winch, 'Security across the local and national in Dili, Timor-Leste' in H. Loney (et al), *Understanding Timor-Leste*, Swinburne Press, Hawthorne, 2014.

Grenfell, Damian, Mayra Walsh, Anna Trembath, Carmenesa M. Noronha and Kym Holthouse 2009, *Understanding community: Security and sustainability in four aldeia in Timor-Leste* (Luha Oli, Nanu, Sarelari and Golgota), Globalism Research Centre (RMIT University), Melbourne.

Grenfell, Damian 2009, 'Reconciliation: Violence and Nation Formation in Timor-Leste' in Grenfell, Damian and Paul James (eds), *Rethinking Insecurity, War and Violence*, Routledge, New York.

Grenfell, Laura 2006, 'Legal pluralism and the rule of law in Timor-Leste', *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 19: 305—337.

Goldsmith, Andrew 2009, "'It wasn't like normal policing": Voices of Australian police peacekeepers in Operation Serene, Timor-Leste 2006', *Policing and Society*, 19(2): 119—133.

Grove, Natalie, Kiera Zen, Eurosia Bucar, Luis M. C. Pereira, Geovana Fernandes and Noemia Amaral 2007, *Like stepping stones in the river: Youth perspectives on the crisis in Timor-Leste*, Plan Timor-Leste, Dili.

Guterres, Aurelio, Benjamin C. Real, Teresa Coelho, Fernando de Sousa Jr, Rui Marques and Pedro Gois 2014, *A country on the move: A profile of internal migration in Timor-Leste*, Research Report, The ACP Observatory on Migration.

Harrington, Andrew 2006, 'Ethnicity, violence, and land and property disputes in Timor-Leste', *East Timor Law Journal*, available via [http://www.easttimorlawjournal.org/ARTICLES/2007/ethnicity\\_violence\\_land\\_property\\_](http://www.easttimorlawjournal.org/ARTICLES/2007/ethnicity_violence_land_property_), viewed 4 September 2014.

Harris, Vandra and Andrew Goldsmith 2012, 'Police in the development space: Australia's international police capacity builders', *Third World Quarterly*, 33(6): 1019—1036.

Harris-Rimmer, Susan 2009, *After the guns fall silent: sexual and gender-based violence in Timor-Leste*, Issue Brief N° 5, Timor-Leste Armed Violence assessment, Dili.

Hohe, Tanja & Rod Nixon 2003, *Reconciling Justice: 'Traditional Law' and State Judiciary in East Timor*, United States Institute of Peace.

International Crisis Group (ICG) 2006, *Resolving Timor-Leste's Crisis*, Asia Report N° 120, Brussels.

International Crisis Group (ICG) 2008, *Timor-Leste: Security Sector Reform*, Asia Report N° 1143, Brussels.

International Crisis Group (ICG) 2009, *Handing back responsibility to Timor-Leste's Police*, Asia Report N° 180, Brussels.

International Crisis Group (ICG) 2013, *Timor-Leste: Stability at what cost?*, Asia Report N° 246, Brussels.

Joliffe, Jill 2004, 'Fears for safety of ex-guerilla after protesters, police clash', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 7 August 2004, available via <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/08/06/1091732093755.html?from=storylhs>, viewed 4 September 2014.

Jütersonke, Oliver, Ryan Murray, Edward Rees, James Scambary 2010, *Urban violence in an urban village: A case study of Dili, Timor-Leste*, Working Paper, Geneva Declaration, Geneva.

Keta Haluha 2010, *Timor police ninja operation*, available via <http://globalvoicesonline.org/2010/03/15/timor-police-ninja-operation>, viewed 7 June 2014.

Kovar, Annika and Andrew Harrington 2013, *Breaking the cycle of domestic violence in Timor-Leste: Access to justice options, barriers and decision making processes in the context of legal pluralism*, Justice System Program (United Nations Development Programme Timor-Leste), Dili.

Lemay-Hébert, Nicolas 2009, 'UNPOL and police reform in Timor-Leste: Accomplishments and setbacks', *International Peacekeeping*, 16(3): 393—406.

Lothe, Elisabeth and Gordon Peake 2010, 'Addressing symptoms but not causes: stabilisation and humanitarian action in Timor-Leste', *Disasters*, 34(3): 427—443.

Maia, Vincent, Alex Cullen and Silas Everett 2012, *Trends of Local Governance in Timor-Leste: Suco Governance Performance Scale (SGPS)*, The Asia Foundation, Dili.

Marc, Alexandra, Alys M. Willman 2010, *Violence in the city: Understanding and supporting community responses to urban violence*, The World Bank, Washington.

Marriot, Andrew 2009, 'Leaders, Lawyers & Lia Nains: Sources of Legal Authority in Timor-Leste', Dili, Understanding Timor-Leste Conference Proceedings, Timor-Leste Studies Association.

Marx, Susan 2013, *Timor-Leste law and justice survey*, The Asia Foundation, Dili.

McAullife, Pdraig 2008, 'East Timor's Community Reconciliation Process as a model for legal pluralism in criminal justice', *Law, Social Justice & Global Development Journal*, 2: 1—21.

McGregor, Andrew, Laura Skeaff and Marianne Bevan 2012, 'Overcoming secularism? Catholic development geographies in Timor-Leste', *Third World Quarterly*, 33(6): 1129—1146.

Ministry of Finance (National Directorate of the Budget) 2008, *Budget Review*, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Dili.

Ministry of Finance 2010(a), *Sensus fo Fila Fali: Bairro Pite*, Dili.

Ministry of Finance 2010(b), *Sensus fo Fila Fali: Comoro*, Dili.

Muggah, Robert and Emile LeBrien (eds) 2010, *Timor-Leste armed violence assessment final report*, Special Report, Small Arms Survey, Geneva.

Murdoch, Lindsay 2005, 'Dili in edge after church urges protest', *The Age*, 20 April 2005, available via <http://www.theage.com.au/news/World/Dili-on-edge-after-church-urges-protest/2005/04/19/1113854199053.html>,

viewed 4 September 2014.

Myrntinen, Henri 2013, 'Phantom menaces: The politics of rumour, securitisation and masculine identities in the shadows of the ninjas', *The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology*, 14(5): 471—485.

National Statistics Directorate 2010, *Population and Housing Census of Timor-Leste: Volume 3 (Social and economic characteristics)*, Ministry of Finance, Dili.

Niner, Sara 2012, 'Barlake: an exploration of marriage practices and issues of women's status in Timor-Leste', *Local Global: Traversing customary community and modern nation formation in Timor-Leste*, 11: 133—153.

Pigou, Piers 2003, *Crying without tears: In pursuit of justice and reconciliation in Timor-Leste: Community perspectives and expectations*, Occasional Paper Series, International Center for Transitional Justice.

Pinto, Julio T. 2003, *A secure future: A focus group report on public attitudes regarding the defence and security of East Timor*, Universidade de Dili, Dili.

Radio Televizaun Timor-Leste 2010, *Dissident political parties accused of involvement in ninja crime in Timor-Leste*, 10 February 2010, available via <http://www.easttimorlawandjusticebulletin.com/2010/02/dissident-political-parties-accused-of.html>, viewed 20 May 2014.

Rees, Edward 2004, *Under Pressure: Falintil – Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste: Three Decades of Defence Force Development in Timor-Leste 1975-2004*, Working Paper N° 139, Geneva, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

República Democrática de Timor-Leste 2011, PNTL: From 2000 to 2011, Media Release 11 May 2011, available via <http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=5001&lang=en>, viewed 22 May 2014.

Robinson Geoffrey 2003, *East Timor 1999: Crimes Against Humanity*, (A report commissioned by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights OHCHR), University of California, Los Angeles.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and The Asia Foundation 2012, *Timor-Leste celebrates a decade of independence*, Policy Report, Singapore.

Scambray, James 2009, *Groups, gangs, and armed conflict in Timor-Leste* Issue Brief N° 2, Timor-Leste Armed Violence assessment, Dili.

Scambray, James 2013, 'Conflict and resilience in an urban squatter settlement in Dili, East Timor', *Urban Studies*, 50(10): 1935—1950.

Suara Timor Lorosa'e 2010, *Timor Police say a new coup plot from CPD-RDTL and Bua Malus*, 1 March 2010, available via <http://www.easttimorlawandjusticebulletin.com/2010/03/timor-police-say-new-coup-plot-from-cpd.html>, viewed 20 May 2014.

Svoboda, Eva and Eleanor Davey 2013, *Police, protection and coordination in Timor-Leste*, HPG Working Paper, Search for Common Ground, Dili.

Taft, Angela and Lyndsey Watson 2013, *Secondary analysis of the 2009—10 Demographic Health Survey Final Report*, GRM International.

The Asia Foundation 2004, *Law and justice in East Timor: A survey of citizen awareness and attitudes regarding law and justice in East Timor*, Dili.

The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) 2009, *Timor-Leste: Security Sector Reform Monitor N° 1*, Waterloo.

The Centre of Studies for Peace and Development (CEPAD) 2010, *Timor-Leste: Voices and paths to peace*, Dili.

Toome, Emily, Damian Grenfell and Kathryn Higgins 2012, *Local perspectives on political decision-making in Timor-Leste: A short report on the 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Dili and Venilale*, Globalism Research Centre (RMIT University), Melbourne.

Trembath, Anna, Damian Grenfell and Carmenesa M. Noronha 2010, *Impacts of NGO gender programming in*

*local communities in Timor-Leste: A collaborative research and evaluation report*, Globalism Research Centre (RMIT University), Melbourne.

Trindade, Josh and Bryant Castro 2007, *Rethinking Timorese identity as a peacebuilding strategy: The Lorosa'e—Loromonu conflict from a customary perspective*, Technical Assistance to the National Dialogue Process, European Union's Rapid Reaction Mechanism Programme, Dili.

TVTL 2013, *L-7 asks Xanana and Mauk Moruk not to provoke each other because we don't want anything to happen like the 2006 crisis* ("L-7 husu Xanana ho Mauk Moruk labele provoka malu tanba lakohi mosu hanesan krizi 2006"), available via <http://www.timorhauniandoben.com/2013/12/l-7-husu-xanana-ho-mauk-moruk-labele.html>, viewed 11 March 2014.

United Nations 2004, *Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor* (for the period from 29 April to 13 August 2004), S/2004/669 (13 August 2004), available via <http://undocs.org/S/2004/669>.

United Nations 2005, *End of mandate report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor* (for the period from 17 February to 11 May 2005), S/2005/310 (12 May 2005), available via <http://undocs.org/S/2005/310>.

United Nations 2006, *Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste*, Geneva, United Nations.

United Nations 2008, *Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 8 January to 8 July 2008)*, S/2008/50 (29 July 2008), available via <http://undocs.org/S/2008/501>.

United Nations 2009, *Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 9 July 2008 to 8 January 2009)*, S/2009/72 (4 February 2009), available via <http://undocs.org/S/2009/72>.

United Nations Department of Public Information 2012, *Fact Sheet: United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste completes its mandate*, available via [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmit/documents/unmit\\_fact\\_sheet\\_11dec2012\\_2.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmit/documents/unmit_fact_sheet_11dec2012_2.pdf), viewed 22 May 2014.

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) and United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) 2008, *Report on human rights developments in Timor-Leste: The security sector and access to justice: 1 September 2007—30 June 2008*, New York.

United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET) 2003, *Executive Summary of investigations of police response to the riots on 4 December 2002*, UNMISSET, Dili.

Van der Auweraert, Peter 2012, *Ending the 2006 internal displacement crisis in Timor-Leste: Between humanitarian aid and transitional justice*, IOM Migration Research Series N°44, International Organization of Migration, Geneva.

Vyavaharkar, Sunita 2009, *Electoral violence in Timor-Leste: Mapping incidents and responses*, Issue Brief N° 3, Timor-Leste Armed Violence assessment, Dili.

Wallis, Joanna 2014, *Constitution Making during State Building*, New York, Cambridge University Press.

Wassel, Todd 2014, *Institutionalising community policing in Timor-Leste: Police development in Asia's youngest country*, The Asia Foundation and Overseas Development Institute, Dili.

Wassel, Todd and Gobie Rajalingam 2014, *A Survey of Community-Police Perceptions in Timor-Leste 2013*, The Asia Foundation, Dili.

Wassel, Todd 2014, *Timor-Leste: Links between Peacebuilding, Conflict Prevention and Durable Solutions to Displacement*, Brookings, Washington.

Wilson, Bu. V. E. 2009, *The exception becomes the norm in Timor-Leste: The draft national security laws and the continuing role of the joint command*, Issue Paper N° 11, Centre for International Governance and Justice (Australian National University), Canberra.

# END NOTES

1. In the days following the announcement of results of the vote for independence, violence in the capital included the: terrorisation and murder of unarmed civilians; house burning; recruitment of male youth into militias through coercion, harassment or bribery; enforced displacement and disappearances of people; rape and sexual harassment of women by Indonesian military and militia; and intimidation, threats and attacks against journalists and international humanitarian workers. Militias and soldiers targeted pro-independence supporters (including community leaders, priests, nuns, students and activists), conducting reprisal and mass killings as well as public executions. Militias attacked IDP camps as well as churches, schools and houses sheltering those displaced. There were also reports of pro-independence supporters being attacked upon entering West Timor. Thousands of people took shelter within the compounds of UNAMET and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) while armed militia men openly attacked and shot at local civilians, expatriate staff and UN vehicles. See Section III of *Report of the High Commission for Human Rights on the human rights situation in East Timor* for further details.
2. Approximately 240,000 people fled, or in most cases were forcibly relocated, to West Timor or other parts of Indonesia. Documents found also indicated advanced planning and preparation by the Indonesian military for the mass removal of 250,000 persons to West Timor (CHR 2000, 5-6).
3. 4 December 2002: riots erupted in 10 different locations across Dili (Police Headquarters, Palácio Governo and the National Parliament Building, Comoro area, Democracy Fields) involving looting and arson, including Prime Minister Alkatiri's house (UNMISSET 2003, 10) after police had mishandled the arrest of a student the previous day. The protests developed into broader antagonism toward the Government, shouting accusations that many former anti-independence militia were in the police force, calling the Government responsible for the murder of the 'freedom fighter' student, and for the resignation of Alkatiri. (ICG 2006, 5; 7 December Joint Statement of Civil Society Organisations in Timor Lorosa'e via East Timor Law and Justice Bulletin).
4. At the end of 2001, a growing number of veterans organisations began to be established, conducting parades and training and 'often causing disruption in Dili and other urban centres', contributing in part to the decision to establish the Secretary of State for Veterans Affairs (ICG 2008, 19-20; Wallis 2014, 133). On 19 July 2004, approximately 120 people (the newly formed National Union of Resistance Staff and Veterans (Joliffe 2004) led by Cornelio Gama 'L-7' (Sagrada Familia) staged a public protest in front of the Government Building in Dili, frustrated by a perceived lack of recognition of veterans and allocation of material benefits. The protest continued into the next day, where police officers then used tear gas to disperse the crowd (UNMISSET 2004, 2). While the trigger for the protest could be seen to be President Xanana Gusmão's recent presentation of the Report of the Veterans Commission (toward a policy of identification, recognition and material benefits), the protest should also be seen in light of the increasing dismissal of F-FDTL officers since December 2003 (27 soldiers) and another 42 in January 2004 who had made allegations of discrimination (Rees 2004, 32; Wallis 2014, 133-34). Indeed, signs of tensions between PNTL and F-FDTL were becoming more and more evident at this time, heightened by the increasing allocation of resources to new specialised forces within PNTL. On 14 January 2004, Alkatiri stated that those protesting the government's decision to supply equipment to the special police forces should leave the army (Rees 2004, 19).
5. Public statements made by the Bishops of Baucau and Dili in February 2008, criticising the Council of Minister's proposal to designate religious education as an optional subject in some primary schools provoked intense debate, culminating in a public demonstration of several thousand people in front of the Government Building in Dili on 19 April, lasting 20 days (UN 2005, 2). Many of the roads into Dili were blocked off with police attempting to stop more trucks carrying protesters coming from Batugade (Bobonaro) into Dili to join the demonstrations (Murdoch 2005).
6. 9 January 2006: Led by Gascao Salsinha, 158 F-FDTL soldiers signed a petition alleging mismanagement and discrimination within F-FDTL (ICG 2006, 6-7). On 3 February, these petitioners abandoned their barracks (United Nations 2006, 21). On 8 February a further 418 petitioners marched at the Palácio das Cinzas (ibid, 21) and on 16 March, Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak (with the support of the Prime Minister) announced the dismissal of 594 soldiers (ibid, 21).
7. Two civilians were killed, four suffered serious firearm injuries, and two persons suffered other serious injuries in front of Government Palace. Other locations included Comoro Market (one death, twelve serious injuries); F-FDTL operational area in Tasi Tolu (two deaths, five seriously injured by firearms); shooting at Mercado Lama (one death, two wounded) (United Nations 2006, 5-7).
8. 3 May: Major Alfredo Reinado and other military police officers abandoned their F-FDTL post, joined by some PNTL officers, and met with the other petitioners in Gleno (Ermera district) (ibid, 29). Major Augusto Tara de Araujo deserted F-FDTL on 4 May and led the '10 District movement' (the 10 western districts) in boycotting the Government (ibid, 30).
9. The house of Brigadier General Ruak was attacked on 24 May, killing one person and injuring two (ibid, 32); on 25 May the home of Minister Rogerio Lobato's in-laws was burnt down and six people were killed (ibid, 7, 39).
10. The UN Independent Commission of Inquiry into the 2006 crisis recorded the following incidents (ibid, 30-38): PNTL UIR (Rapid Response Unit) officers were forced to take shelter in the District Administration Building after being surrounded by a crowd (including petitioners) armed with machetes, knives and rocks (8 May in Gleno, Ermera); nine F-FDTL 1st Battalion soldiers ambushed by members of Reinado's group (23 May in Fatu Ahi, Aileu); eight F-FDTL soldiers patrolling hills of Tasi Tolu and Tibar attacked by police officers from Liquiça district and armed civilians of *Rai Los* (24 May); same group of police officers from Liquiça district and *Rai Los* armed members attacked two F-FDTL patrol squads in the same area; over 200 PNTL officers and civilians armed by F-FDTL hierarchy were moved to various locations in Dili in response to the perceived threat posed by F-FDTL to PNTL (evening of 24 May); convoy of PNTL vehicles in front of Leader store in Comoro ambushed by two truckloads of F-FDTL soldiers and armed civilians and fired upon, one hour later F-FDTL launched two grenades toward PNTL officers, hitting the PNTL building and the nearby university gym (morning of 25 May); roadblock established by Military Police on the afternoon of 25 May (manned by *Oan Kiak*, ex-Falintil soldier, and his men) for the purpose of detaining armed PNTL officers.

11. Nine killed, 27 suffered serious gunshot injuries (ibid, 7).
12. 8 May 2006: Prime Minister Alkatiri, Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato and Vicente da Conceição (Rai Los – an ex-Falintil soldier) met to discuss civilian support for PNTL. HK33 semi-automatic firearms were then delivered to Rai Los in Liquiça (10 firearms, 6,000 rounds of ammunition) and *Lima Lima* '5-5' in Ermera (5 firearms, one crate of ammunition). Rai Los received a further eight HK33 firearms on 21 May. Although initially distributed (legally) for UPF (Border Patrol) officers, eastern members of UPF were disarmed in order for *Rai Los* and *Lima Lima* to receive these weapons (ibid, 38-39). On 24 May, on orders by Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak, F-FDTL began to arm civilians (authorised by the Minister of Defence Rodrigues). Records of weapons showed issuing to 205 civilians – this included ex-Falintil fighters and 64 PNTL officers (ibid, 39; ICG 2006, 12).
13. The government made a formal request on 25 May 2006 to the governments of Australia, Portugal, Malaysia and New Zealand for assistance, with 100 Australian troops the first to land (ICG 2006, 12). The ISF consisted of 925 Australian, 219 Malaysian and 142 New Zealand troops (ICG 2008, 5).
14. The violence was not only a fragmentation of the military and police forces but 'also pitted Dili neighbourhoods (and their youth groups) against each other' (Carapic & Jütersonke 2012, 13).
15. 'Dili serves as the primary location where these groups intermingle and subsequently compete in the markets, over land, and for political power' (Jütersonke et al 2010, 19).
16. Law N°1/2008 *Authorising the President of the Republic to declare a State of Siege* (11 February 2008), proceeded by: Law N°2/2008 *Authorising the President of the Republic to renew the Declaration of the State of Siege* (13 February 2008); Law N°3/2008 *On the regulation of the state of siege and emergency* (22 February 2008); Law N°4/2008 *Authorising the President of the Republic to renew the declaration of the State of Siege* (22 February) and Law N°5/2008 *Authorising the President of the Republic to renew the declaration of the state of siege in the districts of Aileu, Ermera, Bobonaro, Cova Lima, Ainaro, Liquica and Manufahi, and to declare a state of emergency in the districts of Baucau, Lautem, Manatuto, Viqueque and Dili* (20 March 2008).
17. The Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment Reports (TLAVA 2009, 2010) discuss the conflict potential of the IDP reintegration process, specifically that the pressure to quickly finish the process meant that not all of the IDPs were accepted back into communities, and also the government's attempts to facilitate dialogue between gangs and armed groups and their negotiation with the petitioners (Scambray 2009, 5-6; Muggah & LeBrun 2010, 27-29).
18. PNTL began to reassume responsibility for the country's internal security in 2009 beginning in Lautem district, followed by Oecusse and then Manatuto. On 27 March 2011, total transfer of executive power was handed over from UNPOL to PNTL in Dili, also marking the eleventh anniversary of the national police force (RDTL Media Release 11 May 2011: 'PNTL From 2000 to 2011'). See also UNMIT Fact Sheet (2012) United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste completes its mandate.
19. On the evening of 24 September, two assailants rode through the suburbs of Kampung Alor and Fatuhada stabbing people at random, injuring two and killing one (*Belun* 2013; *Suara Timor Lorosa'e* 25 September 2013). Over the following 48 hours, national security actors coordinated their efforts throughout Dili (Public Order Battalion (BOP), Military Police (PM), F-FDTL and PNTL); security checkpoints were established throughout the capital, and PNTL met with media outlets as well as with *Xefe Suku's*, disseminating information to the community (*Belun* 2013). In the subsequent weeks, there was a steady flow of reports circulating about other attacks in the same vein of random, unprovoked stabbings, and it was difficult to clearly ascertain the number of victims.
20. A *suku* (village) is an administrative division within Timor-Leste's state system of governance, comprised of several *aldeias* (sub-village), and are an 'important local government entity to the majority of Timorese citizens regarding relevance to daily livelihood impact' (Maia *et al* 2012, 8). Although not always strictly the case in urban Dili, a *suku* is customarily formed along genealogical lines, however the geographical boundaries do tend to change and can be unclear at times, even to residents themselves.
21. See for instance Galtung (1969, 167), who refers to peace as 'the absence of (the threat of) violence'. A broader, more holistic approach to defining and understanding security, which takes into consideration the social, historical and cultural contexts of an individual or group, is captured well by Bubandt (2005, 277) where he speaks of the 'ontological uncertainty' [in security]. He defines this uncertainty as the 'socially constructed anxiety that shapes pertinent kinds of danger, fears and concerns for a particular community at a particular time. Uncertainty is ontological because 'it is an existential feature of the human condition; and yet it is always socially expressed because different societies have different ways of socially producing it, discursively portraying it, symbolically representing it and politically managing it'.
22. While this remains an under-researched point, we are of the opinion that there are forms of *uma luliks* in Dili. It may be that, as can occur in rural areas, *uma luliks* in Dili are built using modern materials, and thus not be as easily noted by outsiders. Beyond this, given the centrality of customary practices to social life in Timor-Leste, we certainly do not advocate beginning analysis with the presumption that customary practices and beliefs somehow have no effect or influence in the capital.
23. Hohe and Nixon (2003, 16) describe *lisan* as essentially law that 'comprises everything that is 'old' and inherited from the ancestors'. However we take note that the way *lisan* is understood and described is often in the western-centric understanding of a legal system and thus the term 'customary law' is seen as synonymous to *lisan*, or applied when talking about *lisan*. Using the term '*lisan*' refers more to the 'order' given by the ancestors, and wrong-doings are related to the broader socio-cosmic structure rather than the western context of a 'crime'(Hohe & Nixon 2003, 16). In this sense, *lisan* is concerned more broadly with ensuring and regulating harmony and order in the socio-cosmic sense, differing from the paradigm of the western legal system. In line with the idea of *lisan* representing a broader social cosmos, Hicks writes that the term refers to 'values, beliefs, ideas, concepts, customary law and protocols relating to kinship and marriage, rituals, and cosmological notions; indeed, virtually every facet of society and culture' (Hicks 2012, 135).
24. Trindade defines *lulik* as the 'spiritual cosmos' that includes the natural and physical world as well as spirits and ancestors, and are the 'sacred' rules and regulations, a kind of 'moral standard' or compass that dictates relationships between people and nature (Trindade 2011, 1).

25. Again, these examples draw out the more obvious manifestations of what we mean by 'customary' here, and as Hohe and Nixon point out, 'all socio-cultural aspects of 'traditional' society are interdependent,' where 'any one aspect, such as law, kinship or the belief system cannot be extracted from the entire socio-cosmic system without taking it out of context' (Hohe & Nixon 2003, 12).
26. The custodians and interpreters of indigenous Timorese cosmology that negotiate the relationships between people, communities and the environment (seen and unseen) (Marriot 2009, 160).
27. Gangs and martial-arts groups have 'defined territories or turfs' carved out between them which constitute no-go zones, not only for members of opposing groups but also their family members ... placing a significant degree of restriction on public mobility (Jütersonke *et al* 2010, 50). However, in the reverse, these martial arts groups and 'street-corner gangs' also constitute informal community-based security providers (Carapic & Jütersonke 2012, 39), often protecting communities from one another (Scambary 2009, 1).
28. Scambary (2013, 1938) describes this practice as one family establishing a base that 'sponsors' and acts as a 'communication outpost' for members of the extended family from the village of origin.
29. Guterres *et al* (2014, 27) regard family ties as being of crucial importance to Timor-Leste migration patterns. Using the most recent 2010 census data, they stated that of those residents who had migrated into Dili district, 43.0 per cent said that they did so for family reasons (following the family or because of a marriage).
30. Two male youth in Golgota (Dom Alexio, Dili) said that they were not scared in their community because they knew and were friends with their neighbours, hence no problems would occur. When questioned further as to why this was case, the response was 'because...we all come from Ermera' (Grenfell *et al* 2009).
31. In another study, focus group discussions showed elevated reports of psychological and emotional trauma, fear, depression and anxiety about one's security, future and the safety of loved ones, contradicting seemingly positive responses regarding perceptions of security garnered through surveys. The authors of this report were not surprised by this, 'given the way focus group methods reveal more subtle forms of social experience than do household surveys' (Jütersonke *et al* 2010, 41).
32. In contrast, The Asia Foundation's (TAF) recent survey on security asks the question 'How concerned are you about your safety in your locality?' to which Dili registered the highest percentage of people who were 'very' concerned (29.6 per cent) (Wassel & Rajalingam 2014, 27). It could be argued that negative responses are conditioned or influenced by a negatively framed question, and vice versa for more positively framed questions. Another key different to note is that this report uses data from a portion of five suku only, and is therefore not to be taken as broadly representative of the suku itself, nor Dili district more generally.
33. The World Bank's 2010 report on understanding and supporting community responses to urban violence (Dili case study) found that nearly 90 per cent of respondents said that their community was safe, despite relatively high recorded incidents of assaults and robbery. It was hypothesised that in the context of Timor-Leste being one of the most heavily surveyed countries in the world, and with much of the international community predominantly concerned with mass violence, it was possible that participants assumed that the enumerators were researching mass violence rather than interpersonal or criminal violence. Furthermore, FGDs revealed that respondents 'frequently—and consciously—based their assessment of current violence on a comparison to previous historical episodes of violence' (Marc & Willman 2010, 130).
34. As of 20 January 2009, 54 out of the 63 IDP camps in Dili and Baucau had been closed (United Nations 2009, para 45). The last camp to close was Metinaro (Dili district) on 22 August, 2009 (Bishop 2012, 49).
35. Government Decree Law N° 12/2008: Integration of ex-combatants into civil life. Financial compensation packages (total value of USD 3 million) were assigned to the state budget in order to provide incentives to petitioners so that they could 'proceed with a new civilian career' (Ministry of Finance 2008, 36, 48). Each petitioner was eligible to receive a one-off payment of USD 8,000 (ICG 2013, 3).
36. On 29 April 2008, Gastão Salsina and 12 members of his group had surrendered. By early July 2008, 23 suspects related to the assassination attempts were in pre-trial detention (United Nations 2008, para 16).
37. Some NGO staff claimed that the situation in 2009 'was less stable than prior to the 2006 crisis, citing exacerbated tensions within institutions and among communities, outbreaks of gang violence, and the perceivable deep lack of trust and confidence running through society' (Lothe & Peak 2010, 439).
38. This factor is discussed in the World Bank's 2010 case study of urban violence in Dili, 'Experience—especially recent experience—with violence strongly affected perceptions of security in the researched communities' (Marc and Willman 2010, 63).
39. Cases of this include local leaders opposed to the resettlement of families in their communities (Bugalski 2008, 31); fights between returned IDP families over government resettlement payments, one reported case of murder (Muggah *et al* 2010, 25); ownership disputes, one such example recorded by Belun in Aldeia Moris ba Dame (Bairro Pite) in February 2013 (Belun 2013a).
40. Collation of EWER incident monitoring occurring in this report's five survey sites: 450 cases of 'youth violence', however only four cases of martial arts-related violence in Dili.
41. Collation of incidents occurring in this report's five survey sites through EWER incident monitoring (March 2012 – April 2014): 18 incidents caused by '*adi malu*' (known as a revenge or hatred attack) or as a result of a 'private' issue.
42. One World Bank Study on urban violence in Timor-Leste found that female FGD participants would speak of how cases of public harassment of females (often sexually based), 'would sometimes escalate into violence between martial arts groups when the victimized female would call upon their boyfriends, brothers or male relatives' (Marc & Willman 2010, 132). This dynamic is also captured in EWER incident monitoring (March 2012 – April 2014): Seven incidents where interpersonal violence (usually assault or harassment) has led to the involvement of relatives, or the calling upon of fellow gang members.
43. For a comprehensive account of IDPs see Wassel 2014, *Timor-Leste: Links between Peacebuilding, Conflict Prevention and Durable Solutions to Displacement*, Brookings, Washington.
44. One recent example of this is when a group of youth murdered a male youth in Aldeia Mate LaHotu in December 2013 (Comoro) (Belun 2013e; Belun 2013f) —allegedly a revenge-attack related to an unresolved issue involving the victim—



resulted in the establishment of a temporary police post stationing several BOP officers in order to deter further follow-up incidents that has since remained. A recent report on the dynamics of martial arts related conflict and violence cite respondents emphasising 'the importance of a police presence in order to deter and reduce conflict potential, with many requesting the establishment of Permanent Police posts in their areas to guarantee security and stability' (Belun, 2014b, 27).

45. Question 18 'If there is a problem in your local community, do you prefer to call the police rather than the local authorities?'; Question 24 'If a really big problem occurs in your local community, do people normally call the police?'

46. Based on the 2010 *Sensus Fo Fila Fali* Suco reports for Bairro Pite and Comoro.

47. Respondent, Comoro: "I think it is more secure in the districts, because in the districts there are many families who you know and have connections with. But in Dili, people can be living alone. Some people are good, but others you don't know."

48. Respondent, Comoro: "To me, there are more problems in the *foho* [mountains]. Baucau, Viqueque, Uatulari, conflicts always happen there."

49. 45% of 'ever-married women' had experienced physical violence, sexual violence, or a combination of both (Taft & Watson 2013, 3); out of 679 cases of gender-based violence reported to PNTL in 2009, 462 of those were categorised as domestic violence (UNHCR and UNMIT 2010, 21).

50. Kovar & Harrington (2013, 10) write that even with the enactment of the RDTL Parliamentary Law N° 7/2010 Law Against Domestic Violence, victims were still 'subject to pressure to withdraw cases, whether explicitly or through latent social pressures from their spouses, family or local authorities', indicating that the understanding of violence or conflict within the home is still, in practice and reality, considered a private matter.

51. Interestingly, in The Asia Foundation's 2013 survey on community police perceptions, domestic violence rated as the second highest problem (19.0 per cent) by respondents of security concerns in their locality (Wassel & Rajalingam 2014, 20). This may be due to an increasing recognition of the public dimensions of domestic violence, especially since the passing of the National Law Against Domestic Violence in 2010.

52. While results across all survey sites are similar, Bemori had the most variation. The highest percentage (65.0 per cent) of respondents felt that women and men felt the same level of security. In contrast, only 5.7 per cent of Bemori respondents felt that women felt more secure, and an additional 1.9 per cent thought 'probably women'. While these figures are only slightly lower than the comparative average across all sites, it may suggest the perception that women in Bemori are more insecure in their community than in other sites.

53. Similar points are made by Toome *et al* (2012, 18) in which researchers were concerned that the 'language and rhetoric of 'democratic best-practice' could frame people's responses in terms of telling the interviewer what they wanted to hear. Unclear where quote finishes In Bemori for example, one respondent initially stated that he felt males were more secure in his *bairru*, however immediately proceeded to say that that looking at democratic times now, males and females were both equally safe. Similarly, when asked if they thought women had an important role to play in conflict resolution, one male respondent in Comoro stated: "Females have an important role to play because now men and women have the same rights."

54. Several respondents answered this question similarly, in terms of females and males working together to contribute to further development of their country (Male Respondent, Bemori), survey #446, and also of working together and 'collaborating' to 'make the situation peaceful [*hakmatek*] and calm' (Male Respondent, Becora) survey #18.

55. Data from Belun's most recent *Conflict Potential Analysis Report* demonstrated a rise in these figures, with men causing 86.3 per cent of incidents while also representing 73.1 per cent of victims in all incidents recorded (Belun 2014c, 12).

56. Interviews conducted by Grenfell *et al* (2009, 118) elicited similar high responses when asked about women's involvement in conflict resolution, which was taken in the context of emphasising the 'sociality of conflict resolution, seeing it as an interconnected process that involves members of families and communities, and as such, women'.

57. Survey results from one World Bank report show that while attendance rates at community meetings is roughly equal, young females were 13 percentage points less likely to have spoken or contributed to the most recent meeting they had attended (Dale *et al* 2010, 3).

58. A number of authors and organisations have specifically discussed the plurality of justice and security provision in Timor-Leste. See Chopra *et al* 2009, Fostering justice in Timor-Leste; Graydon 2005, Local justice systems in Timor-Leste: Washed up or watch this space; Grenfell 2007, Legal Pluralism and the rule of law in Timor-Leste; Grenfell & Winch 2014, Security across the local and national in Dili, Timor-Leste; McAullife 2008, East Timor's Community Reconciliation Process as a Model for Legal Pluralism in Criminal Justice; The Asia Foundation Law and Justice surveys (2004, 2008, 2013).

59. In a ceremony held at a local church to resolve a conflict between two gangs in Golgota (Dom Aleixo, Dili) an NGO was involved in providing livestock and money to the *Xefe Suku* to buy food so that those who attended could eat together. The two groups were invited to sit together and talk, reinforced by a *Juramentu* which ensured that whoever transgressed agreements made to keep the peace would have to pay a fine in the form of buffalo and pigs (Grenfell *et al* 2009, 119).

60. An 'antiviolence network' composed of community policing members, representatives of the Secretary of State for Youth and Sport, The Catholic Church's Commission for Peace and Justice and various human rights organisations such as HAK have been quite successful in dealing with martial arts group rivalries. Each actor provided a specific service, with HAK and the representative from Secretary of State for Youth and sport initiating mediation. If unsuccessful, police would make arrests, and dialogue would ensue between the protagonists to ensure that the issue would be fully resolved (Braithwaite *et al* 2012, 170).

61. Grenfell *et al* (2009) notes that it is important to acknowledge the variety of leadership positions within communities such as priests, nuns, teachers, doctors and nurses. Furthermore, all these positions do not sit in 'stark contradiction with one another' but should be seen in the context of 'interconnection and fluidity'. The various roles they fulfil according to the needs and reasons of a community, out of respect for their 'particular abilities or access to resources means that it is not so much a blanket preference of one over another, but rather that calling upon one prior to another is predicated upon the issue or problem at hand' (Grenfell *et al* 2009, 108).

62. The Asia Foundation 2013 Community Police Perception Survey, question 15E, unpublished survey findings.

63. Customarily, the legitimacy of local authorities requires 'longstanding social and familial relationships with members of the community, often predicated upon genealogy and affinal relations in communities with relatively low levels of mobility (Jütersonke *et al* 2010, 42). In Dili, where many members of the community, including the leaders, are mobile, the connections that hold people to a particular authority can be much weaker. Similarly, youth who have migrated to Dili for either educational or employment opportunities may not recognise the authority of local leaders on the basis that there they are no longer connected via familial or even ethno-linguistic relations. Given that over half of the respondents (62.3 per cent, n = 506) are aged 17 – 29, the somewhat lower preference for local authorities could reflect this sentiment where it relates to those who have moved to Dili.
64. Andrew Harrington also notes that instead of stemming violence, some *xefe suku* and *xefe aldeia* 'are alleged instead to have both driven gangs and actually participated in violence' (Harrington 2006, 45). The Golgota respondent's claim about local leaders' capacity to resolve problems can also be understood in a different light as explained by Harrington where some community leaders having only been elected in November 2005 as 'virtual FRETILIN appointees simply lacked constituent support and the legitimacy necessary to control or mediate disputes' (*ibid*, 45).
65. Respondent, Comoro.
66. Respondent, Comoro: "if it is a big problem like a person armed with a gun, then you need to call the police".
67. See also Pigou 2003, 31.
68. Similarly, the World Bank (2010, 4-5) identified a key variable in whether it was a 'violent' or 'non-violent' dispute, where the latter was deemed to be resolvable within the community. Note: domestic violence was not included in this classification between violent and non-violent disputes in order to identify which authority to call upon. In essence, in many cases the categorisation of the severity of a crime—even when involving murder, physical or sexual assault—does not apply to situations in which those crimes have occurred in the home.
69. This is consistent with The Asia Foundation's 2013 survey on community police perceptions which found that 71.0 per cent of respondents from Dili felt that PNTL's performance was 'much better' than the previous year. However, given that only 12.0 per cent of respondents said that they had 'any type of contact' with PNTL over the past year, that report suggests that the level of reported confidence could more be a reflection of an 'aspiration or desire for the police as an institution to provide security in their [respondent's] communities, rather than as confidence deriving from the actual presence of the PNTL' (Wassel & Rajalingam 2014, 46).
70. Question 18: If there is a problem in your local community, do you prefer to call the police rather than local authorities to assist its resolution? 68.4 per cent answered 'definitely police'.
- Question 24: If a really big problem occurs in your local community, do people normally call the police? 87.3 per cent answered 'definitely yes'.
71. See also Svoboda & Davey 2013, 11; Wassel 2014, 8; Burgess 2012, 15.
72. Article 27: Organisation of the Special Police Unit of RDTL Decree Law N° 9/2009 on the Organic Law of Timor-Leste's National Police (PNTL): Public Order Battalion (BOP), Close Protection Company (CSP) and Special Operations Company (COE).
73. The reactivation of PNTL's Dili Task force in 2007 resulted in the dramatic drop of street violence within two weeks, and night time vehicle and pedestrian traffic returned within a month. The units were mandated to use force 'if necessary' and attracted much criticism from UNMIT, however 'the population of Dili deemed the initiative a success' (The Center for International Governance Innovation 2009, 4). Lemay-Hébert (2009, 397) also writes that the task force 'quickly became well known for its cavalier methods of arresting and interrogating gang members...playing a role in curbing gang-related crime in the capital, although at the cost of serious human rights violations'.
74. It could be suggested that political discourse and the media has also played a role in nurturing this perception of policing approaches, furthering PNTL legitimacy and perceptions of competency. A year prior to this survey being conducted, a large-scale PNTL operation was launched against 'ninjas' responsible for a range of crimes including murder, and systematic intimidation that was inciting fear and panic amongst communities in the Western districts of Covalima and Bobonaro, the effects of which reverberated to Dili (See: <http://globalvoicesonline.org/2010/03/15/timor-police-ninja-operation/>; Myrntinen 2013, 474). While it was later uncovered that the operation was in fact targeting a supposed 'coup' from CPD-RDTL and *Bua Malus*, one PNTL commander said that 'excessive use of power was exercised in order to restore peace and stability in the country' because people were 'crying for help'. (See: '*Timor Police say new coup plot from CPD-RDTL and Bua Malus*' and '*Dissident political parties accused of involvement in ninja crime in Timor-Leste*'). More recently, the National Parliament's Resolution Against Illegal groups (Belun 2014a) saw PNTL applauded for their efforts at carrying out this operation 'successfully' and restoring stability to the entire nation (See *Fundasaun Mahein congratulates PNTL on their execution of the Parliamentary Resolution*). In light of these two examples, it is not unreasonable to assume that such discourse may influence or further define people's perceptions of police competency, and thus, how they may have answered Question Twenty Five.
75. Burgess quotes an interviewee who explained the difficulty of family relations in terms of policing, in that it places limitations on the willingness of certain officers to arrest or to bring a perpetrator to justice if they are a family member (Burgess 2012, 13).
76. An internal evaluation of the scheme reported incidents of falsification of registrations for recovery package beneficiaries, with some MSS staff selling forms, resulting in duplicate cases and leading to anger when beneficiaries had discovered that somebody had already used their file number to claim benefits (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2009, 44).
77. Belun's 2009 report on reducing community tensions through housing also notes that the conflict potential of IDP returns is two-fold; i) that 'the influx of persons with no previous residence in the area may bring questioning and tensions around changing community identity and difficulty in establishing social ties', and secondly, place a greater strain on the local labour market, upsetting 'established patterns of commerce and employment' (Belun 2009, 7).
78. Burgess notes that there were many inequalities with the program, with many missing out on opportunities and others who appeared to have been helped too much, with nepotism involved (Burgess 2012, 8).

79. Respondent, Bemori: "Some people are really mad when they see the State because they did not respond quickly enough with the necessities that they needed."
80. The total expenditure for recovery packages and associated operational costs (Cash Recovery Grant Scheme) was USD 56.8 million. This program, managed by the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS), was intended to assist IDPs to return or resettle, providing financial compensation based on the extent of destruction or damage caused to their home. However, by 2010, of the 6,800 cases verified, only 1,727 received payment (Bishop 2012, 47).
81. Respondent, Comoro: "People aren't really content because they [the state] did not resolve problems with good decisions...and this had impacts for the future."
82. Respondent, Bairro Pite: "It is bad because their objective is just to make money from our country". Respondent, Bairro Pite: "It is bad because they are just taking advantage of the situation and our country".
83. Respondent, Becora: "I feel happy if *malae* [foreigners] are here because they are neutral. They will know what is wrong, and what is right. But if it is just Timorese....they are not really neutral".
84. One interviewee in Becora expressed his preference for Australian or New Zealand soldiers because they 'worked together with Timor's armed forces', but gave a negative view of UNPOL because they would 'do wrong things but not get punished'. This level of impunity is corroborated by another report which discussed confrontations between international and national officers that did not lead to the UN taking action against the personnel involved. The new General Commander of PNTL, on national television, openly criticised and urged UNPOL to identify and punish those involved (CIGI 2009, 5).
85. 'The new government demonstrated considerable frustration with the seeming inability of international actors to restore normalcy to Dili's security environment' (CIGI 2009, 4). Lemay-Hébert (2009, 397) also writes of the effectiveness of the task force.
86. The *Guarda Nacional Republicana* (GNR) are a 'commando-style unit of strength...viewed by Timorese with a degree of fearful respect (Burgess 2012, 11). They were seen as much younger and fitter looking than the Australian soldiers, equipped with a wider range of non-lethal weaponry, including gas and rubber bullets (Goldsmith 2009, 120, 125-126).
87. The *GNR* Formed Police Units (FPU) were instrumental in restoring security and order in Dili—in large part due to their experience in riot and demonstration control—which 'masked the relative ineptitude of other UNPOL contingents' (Lemay-Hébert 2009, 396).
88. Question 30: Do you think it is good that there are people from other countries involved in providing security inside Timor-Leste?
- Question 28: Do you think that UNPOL had a positive or negative impact on security in Dili?
- Question 29: Do you think that ISF had a positive or negative impact on security in Dili?
89. Caritas Australia, Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Mary MacKillop, Trocaire, to name a few.
90. The church also provided food, clothing, basic medical care, and safety and support for widows, victims of physical and sexual violence, and orphans (McGregor *et al* 2012, 1135).
91. Respondent, Comoro: "There are no other organisations. Because of this, those of us who were displaced could only go to Churches".
92. Human sources constituted the following options in the survey: family, local leaders, police, religious leaders, workmates, and friends or neighbours.
93. The Asia Foundation's 2013 survey on community police perceptions found that since 2008, television had become the primary source of security information (39.0 per cent), overtaking information received from friends and family, with television rating much higher for results from Dili than other districts (Wassel & Rajalingam 2014, 27).
94. See Appendix 1: Survey Data for literacy rates of respondents.
95. Question 8 'Do you feel secure in the community where you live now?' 93.2 per cent.  
Question 9 'Do you feel more secure in your local community now than you did 2 years ago?' 78.3 per cent.  
Question 10 'Do you feel more secure in your local community now than you did 5 years ago?' 82.4 per cent.  
Question 13 'Do you feel more secure in Dili now than you did 5 years ago?' 82.6 per cent.  
Question 14 'Do you feel more secure in Dili now than you did 5 years ago?' 83.1 per cent.
96. Respondent, Comoro: "Recently we have seen some people go to jail, but others have now. So for me, I think some issues have been resolved but some have not".
97. Respondent, Bemori: "I don't really think the issues have been resolved because all the *povo kiik* [little people] are still complaining. People are complaining that their houses have not been rebuilt. Through the Ministry of Solidarity, the state has seen the houses but have still not contributed to all. They have only contributed to some, and so for me I don't think all the problems have been resolved".
98. Thirty four electoral-related incidents were recorded in the first round of Presidential Elections, mostly characterised by inter-party tensions, with stone throwing, verbal threats, property damage and fights between party supporters. Belun 2012a, 1.  
Round 2 of Presidential elections saw 47 electoral-related incidents, noting rumours of intimidation during the campaign period, provoking public emotion and conflict as well as invoking memories of trauma and instability' (Belun 2012b, 1).
99. Respondent, Bairro Pite: "I don't think that there will be problems [with the elections] when our leaders think of developing our land".
100. Respondent, Comoro: "I feel that there could be problems if all the leaders want to make their own policies. But if they sit together to bring our nation to peace then nothing will happen".
101. A sense of apprehension remains relevant through different moments of insecurity in the capital. For instance, recent events and political dynamics in Dili where, since mid-2013 increasing vocalism from Sr Mauk Moruk and his group *Conselho Revolusaun Maubere* (CRM), calling for Xanana Gusmao to resign and the dissolution of the Parliament, culminated in the passing of Parliamentary Resolution No. 5/2014 (Belun 2014a). A televised debate between Prime Minister Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao and Sr. Mauk Moruk (which Moruk, in the end, did not attend) caused some low levels of public anxiety, with Gusmao advising everyone to 'stay calm and indoors, to exercise caution and avoid the possibility of tensions arising in

public spaces' (Belun 2013d, 1). See: '*L-7 asks Xanana and Mauk Moruk not to provoke each other because we don't want another anything to happen like the 2006 crisis*' for similar examples of how there is a common public discourse of wanting to maintain calmness and national stability, and the importance of political figures in doing this. As argued by Pinto (2003, 9), the historical context of Timor-Leste has meant that political differences and lengthy debates 'incite a sense of fear among the people' of 'threats to national security'.

## APPENDIX 1: SURVEY DATA

Locales where the survey was conducted

Locale	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Comoro	168	20.7	20.7
Bairro Pite	160	19.7	40.4
Bemori	159	19.6	60.0
Becora	164	20.2	80.2
Lahane Oriental	161	19.8	100.0
Total	812	100.0	

Origin of birth

Birthplace	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Dili	238	29.3	29.3
Manufahi	42	5.2	34.5
Ermera	64	7.9	42.4
Bobonaro	85	10.5	52.8
Liquica	17	2.1	54.9
Baucau	71	8.7	63.7
Lautem	30	3.7	67.4
Oecusse	29	3.6	70.9
Viqueque	66	8.1	79.1
Covalima	19	2.3	81.4
Ainaro	44	5.4	86.8
Aileu	57	7.0	93.8
Manatuto	42	5.2	99.0
Other country	8	1.0	100.0
Total	812	100.0	

Gender

Gender	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Female	454	55.9	55.9
Male	358	44.1	100.0
Total	812	100.0	

## Literacy

Literacy level	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
No I cannot	68	8.4	8.4
I can read and write a little	50	6.2	14.5
I know how to read and write	693	85.3	100.0
Total	811	99.9	
Missing	1	0.1	

## Education

Education level	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
No schooling	70	8.6	8.6
Finished primary school	68	8.4	17.0
Finished junior high school	150	18.5	35.5
Finished senior high school	420	51.7	87.3
Finished diploma level	43	5.3	92.6
Undergraduate (S1)	56	6.9	99.5
Postgraduate (S2 or S3)	4	0.5	100.0
Total	811	99.9	
Missing	1	0.1	

## Age

Age	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
17-19	133	16.4	16.4
20-29	373	45.9	62.3
30-39	139	17.1	79.4
40-49	68	8.4	87.8
50-59	61	7.5	95.3
60-69	21	2.6	97.9
70-79	7	0.9	98.8
80-89	1	0.1	98.9
90-100	4	0.5	99.4
Don't know	5	0.6	100.0
Total	812	100.0	

# APPENDIX 2: QUESTIONNAIRE

1. IN WHICH DISTRICT WERE YOU BORN?

- |                                   |                                       |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Dili     | <input type="checkbox"/> Manufahi     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Ermera   | <input type="checkbox"/> Bobonaro     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Liquica  | <input type="checkbox"/> Baucau       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Lautem   | <input type="checkbox"/> Oecusse      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Viqueque | <input type="checkbox"/> Covalima     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Ainaro   | <input type="checkbox"/> Aileu        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Manatuto | <input type="checkbox"/> Other nation |

2. WHAT IS YOUR SEX?

- |                                 |                               |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Female | <input type="checkbox"/> Male |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|

3. CAN YOU READ AND WRITE?

- |  |
|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> No I cannot                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I can read and write a little |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I know how to read and write  |

4. TO WHAT LEVEL OF EDUCATION HAVE YOU COMPLETED?

- |  |
|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> No schooling            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Finished primary school |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Finished junior high    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Finished senior high    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Finished diploma level  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Undergraduate (S1)      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Postgraduate (S2 or S3) |

5. HOW OLD ARE YOU?

- |                                 |                                     |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 18-19  | <input type="checkbox"/> 20-29      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 30-39  | <input type="checkbox"/> 40-49      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 50-59  | <input type="checkbox"/> 60-69      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 70-79  | <input type="checkbox"/> 80-89      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 90-200 | <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know |

6. IN GENERAL, DO PEOPLE IN DILI RESPECT THE LAW OF THE STATE?

(Do you agree or disagree with this phrase?)

5	Agree strongly
4	Agree
3	Neutral
2	Disagree
1	Strongly disagree
0	No opinion

7. DO PEOPLE HAVE TO FOLLOW THE LAW EVEN IF THEY THINK IT IS WRONG?

(Do you agree or disagree with this phrase?)

5	Agree strongly
4	Agree

3	Neutral
2	Disagree
1	Strongly disagree
0	No opinion

8. DO YOU FEEL SECURITY IN THE LOCAL COMMUNITY WHERE YOU LIVE NOW?

5	Yes, secure
4	Perhaps secure
3	Neutral
2	Perhaps not secure
1	Not secure
0	No opinion

9. DO YOU FEEL MORE SECURE IN YOUR LOCAL COMMUNITY NOW THAN YOU DID TWO YEARS AGO?

5	Definitely yes
4	Probably yes
3	Neutral
2	Probably no
1	Definitely not
0	No opinion

10. DO YOU FEEL MORE SECURE IN YOUR LOCAL COMMUNITY NOW THAN YOU DID FIVE YEARS AGO?

5	Definitely yes
4	Probably yes
3	Neutral
2	Probably no
1	Definitely not
0	No opinion

11. DO YOU THINK MEN OR WOMEN FEEL MORE SECURITY IN YOUR LOCAL COMMUNITY?

5	Men
4	Probably men
3	The same for both
2	Probably women
1	Women
0	No opinion

12. DO YOU THINK THERE IS PEACE IN YOUR LOCAL COMMUNITY?

5	Definitely yes
---	----------------

4	Probably yes
3	Neutral
2	Probably no
1	Definitely not
0	No opinion

13. WITH REGARDS TO SECURITY IN DILI, DO YOU FEEL MORE SECURE IN DILI NOW THAN YOU DID TWO YEARS AGO?

5	Definitely yes
4	Probably yes
3	Neutral
2	Probably no
1	Definitely not
0	No opinion

14. DO YOU FEEL MORE SECURE IN DILI NOW THAN YOU DID FIVE YEARS AGO?

5	Definitely yes
4	Probably yes
3	Neutral
2	Probably no
1	Definitely not
0	No opinion

15. DO YOU THINK THAT MORE CRIME IS COMMITTED IN DILI OR IN OTHER DISTRICTS?

5	Definitely Dili
4	Probably Dili
3	Neutral
2	Probably districts
1	Definitely districts
0	No opinion

16. DO YOU FEEL MORE SECURE IN DILI OR IN OTHER DISTRICTS?

5	Definitely Dili
4	Probably Dili
3	Neutral
2	Probably districts
1	Definitely districts
0	No opinion

17. WHERE DO YOU GET YOUR INFORMATION ABOUT THE SECURITY SITUATION IN DILI FROM?

- Radio
- Family
- Television

- Local Leaders
- Police
- Newspapers
- Religious Leaders
- Workmates
- Political Leaders
- Friends/Neighbours (not family)
- I usually don't get information
- Other (please specify):

18. IF THERE IS A PROBLEM IN YOUR LOCAL COMMUNITY, DO YOU PREFER TO CALL THE POLICE RATHER THAN THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO ASSIST ITS RESOLUTION?

(Local authorities such as the *xefe suku*, *xefe aldeia* or the *lia nain*)

5	Definitely Police
4	Probably Police
3	Neutral
2	Probably Local Authority
1	Definitely Local Authority
0	No opinion

19. WHEN THERE ARE PROBLEMS IN YOUR LOCAL COMMUNITY, IS CUSTOMARY LAW USED TO HELP RESOLVE IT?

5	Definitely yes
4	Probably yes
3	Neutral
2	Probably no
1	Definitely not
0	No opinion

20. IF THERE IS A PROBLEM IN YOUR COMMUNITY, CAN PEOPLE FIND A SOLUTION FROM WITHIN THEIR COMMUNITY OR NOT?

5	Definitely yes
4	Probably yes
3	Neutral
2	Probably no
1	Definitely not
0	No opinion

21. DO YOU THINK WOMEN HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION WITHIN YOUR COMMUNITY OR NOT?

5	Definitely yes
4	Probably yes
3	Neutral
2	Probably no



1	Definitely not
0	No opinion

22. DO YOU THINK THAT SINCE THE CRISIS THE STATE HAS HELPED ENSURE PEACE IN YOUR COMMUNITY OR NOT?

5	Definitely yes
4	Probably yes
3	Neutral
2	Probably no
1	Definitely not
0	No opinion

23. DO YOU THINK THAT SINCE THE CRISIS OTHER ORGANISATIONS HAVE HELPED TO CREATE PEACE IN YOUR COMMUNITY OR NOT?  
(Other organisations like NGOs, the United Nations, etc.)

5	Definitely yes
4	Probably yes
3	Neutral
2	Probably no
1	Definitely not
0	No opinion

24. IF A REALLY BIG PROBLEM OCCURS IN YOUR LOCAL COMMUNITY, DO PEOPLE NORMALLY CALL THE POLICE?

5	Definitely yes
4	Probably yes
3	Neutral
2	Probably no
1	Definitely not
0	No opinion

25. IF THE POLICE ARE CALLED, DO YOU THINK THAT THEY DEAL WITH PROBLEMS BETTER NOW THAN IN THE PAST?

5	Definitely yes
4	Probably yes
3	Neutral
2	Probably no
1	Definitely not
0	No opinion

26. IN GENERAL, DO YOU THINK THAT POLICE RESOLVE CONFLICTS IN A NEUTRAL WAY OR NOT?

5	Definitely yes
---	----------------

4	Probably yes
3	Neutral
2	Probably no
1	Definitely not
0	No opinion

27. OVER THE LAST YEAR, HAVE YOU OR YOUR FAMILY BEEN VICTIMS OF CRIME?

- Yes (See below)
- No (Go to Question 28)

IF YES, DID YOU TELL THE POLICE OR NOT?

- Yes
- No

28. DO YOU THINK THAT UNPOL (UN POLICE) HAVE HAD A POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE IMPACT ON SECURITY IN DILI?

5	Definitely positive
4	Probably positive
3	Neutral
2	Probably negative
1	Definitely negative
0	No opinion

29. IN GENERAL, DO YOU THINK THAT THE ISF (INTERNATIONAL STABILISATION FORCE) HAS HAD A POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE EFFECT ON SECURITY IN DILI?

5	Definitely positive
4	Probably positive
3	Neutral
2	Probably negative
1	Definitely negative
0	No opinion

30. DO YOU THINK THAT IT IS GOOD THAT THERE ARE PEOPLE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN PROVIDING SECURITY INSIDE TIMOR-LESTE OR NOT?

5	Definitely good
4	Probably good
3	Neutral
2	Probably not good
1	Definitely not good
0	No opinion

31. DO YOU THINK THAT THE PROBLEMS THAT MADE THE CRISIS OCCUR HAVE BEEN RESOLVED OR NOT?

5	Definitely yes
4	Probably yes
3	Neutral
2	Probably no
1	Definitely not
0	No opinion

32. IN GENERAL, DO YOU THINK THAT PEOPLE ARE SATISFIED WITH HOW THE CRISIS HAS BEEN RESPONDED TO BY THE STATE?

5	Definitely yes
4	Probably yes
3	Neutral
2	Probably no
1	Definitely not
0	No opinion

33. DO YOU WORRY THAT THERE WILL BE CONFLICT WITHIN THE ELECTIONS NEXT YEAR OR NOT?

5	Definitely yes
4	Probably yes
3	Neutral
2	Probably no
1	Definitely not
0	No opinion

34. DO YOU THINK THAT DILI WILL DEVELOP PEACEFULLY OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS OR NOT?

5	Definitely yes
4	Probably yes
3	Neutral
2	Probably no
1	Definitely not
0	No opinion

35. DO YOU THINK THAT A CRISIS LIKE 2006 COULD OCCUR AGAIN IN DILI OR NOT?

5	Definitely yes
4	Probably yes
3	Neutral
2	Probably no
1	Definitely not
0	No opinion

